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 Previous research in organizational theory, labor market economics, and nonprofit 
studies are applied to churches and their clergy leadership in advancing a theory of clergy 
executive compensation.  The present study, characterizes churches as mission-
maximizing nonprofits operating in a religious market.  The data for this study come 
from the end of year reports from approximately 800 local churches of the North Georgia 
Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church for the years 2007-2008 and a survey 
administered in order to glean the personal characteristics of the clergy.  The 
investigation employs a clergy compensation framework and finds that clergy salaries are 
influenced in part by personal characteristics, human capital, organizational elements, 
labor market factors, and clergy performance.   
 The degree to which clergy, as agents, achieve the aims of their principal, the 
church and/or denomination, is the main avenue through which we can understand what 
factors influence clergy salaries.  Denominational churches achieve their goals through a 
hierarchical relationship suggestive of a nonprofit franchise.  The franchise / hierarchical 
arrangement places clergy in a "dual agency" tension.  Clergy affiliated with hierarchical 
denominations operate as dual agents because they serve two principals, the 
congregation, and the denomination.  If clergy are in autonomous churches, the local 
church is the sole principal. 
 Ordination stratifies the labor market differentiating clergy from their non-
ordained colleagues.  Further, ordination functions as a signal of commitment to the 
denomination and legitimacy to the laity resulting in financial benefit to ministers.  
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Clergy are also rewarded on the basis of managerial scope, where they receive higher 
wages as compensation for their assumed managerial acumen and responsibility.  
 This study also recognizes that clergy operate in a labor market.  Churches 
without a hierarchy have a labor market that is comparatively more competitive.  The 
present research suggests that within the more autonomous denominations there may also 
be market stratification on the basis of some attribute that differentiates clergy from one 
another and signals commitment. 
 The results regarding the role of credentialing in stratified labor markets have 
implications for policy.  The present research adds to the nonprofit executive 
compensation literature by suggesting that denominational churches are analogous to 
nonprofit franchises and by empirically testing for "dual agency", labor market 





 The church is a unique institution because few organizations claim divine origins.  
The language used to describe the church emphasizes the distinction.  When we use 
words like holy, sacred, and spiritual to describe the church, we give the sense that the 
church is otherworldly and beyond our comprehension.  Although the church has several 
distinguishing characteristics, churches and clergy are in many ways similar to 
organizations and workers outside of the religious context. 
 For example, religious organizations function in a market where demanders and 
suppliers of religious goods and services meet for exchange.  There exists a labor market 
for clergy where available clergy find employment and churches seek employable clergy 
at a determined wage.  Like other organizations, churches seek to attain a specific 
mission within the context of organizational constraints.  Ministers possess individual 
characteristics and motivation that serve them in their work.  The purpose of the present 
study is to advance a theory of clergy executive compensation based on nonprofit 
research, organizational theory, and labor market economics. 
 Executive compensation for clergy gained public attention recently when some 
religious nonprofit leaders were investigated at the urging of Sen. Charles Grassley and 
the Senate Finance Committee (Sataline, 2007).  The purpose of the inquiry was to 
ascertain whether the ministries participated in for-profit activities where they were 
avoiding tax payments and to determine if the ministers benefited personally from the 
ministry.  The interest in ministerial salaries parallels the scrutiny of pay levels for other 
nonprofit executives.  Although much of the scholarship has been in the proprietary 
2 
 
sector, the nonprofit sector demonstrates an interest in the subject of executive salaries as 
illustrated by The Chronicle of Philanthropy's annual listing of the salaries of nonprofit 
leaders. 
 Questions regarding nonprofit compensation practices became salient and 
garnered particular scrutiny because of several factors.  Leete (2006) observes a carry-
over effect from the critique of for-profit sector salaries as for-profit executive 
compensation increased.  For-profit executive compensation practices shifted toward 
linking the manager’s salary with organizational fiscal performance in an effort to 
address the classical agency problem and align the interests of shareholders and leaders.  
Similarly, according to the annual survey of the Chronicle of Philanthropy (Barton and 
Gose, 2008), nonprofit executive salaries at the largest nonprofits have increased as well 
over time.  Accordingly, nonprofit stakeholders sought ways to link the wages of 
nonprofit managers to mission-related outcomes.  The prevailing challenge for nonprofits 
seeking to link pay to performance was defining appropriate measures of performance 
that were quantifiable. 
 There were also several scandals involving nonprofit leaders and their salaries 
that raised questions of excessive executive compensation (Leete, 2006).  The board of 
regents of the Smithsonian Institute admitted that they had fallen asleep at the wheel 
regarding the oversight of the secretary (executive director) who used the nonprofit’s 
funds for chauffeurs and private planes (Grimaldi, 2007; Independent Review Committee 
Smithsonian Institution, 2007).  Intensifying the debate on nonprofit executive 
compensation are recent efforts by Congress, state attorneys general, and several private 
organizations to improve the accountability of charities. 
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 The determinants of clergy executive compensation is the research question 
undertaken by this investigation.  By analyzing a unique data set of over 700 churches 
and their clergy leaders, this study intends to test several hypotheses about the 
determinants of clergy executive compensation.  The religious marketplace provides the 
conceptual context for the present investigation. 
1.1 The Religious Marketplace 
 Religious markets, the arenas for exchange of religious goods and services, are 
comprised of religious producers and religious consumers.  We will assume that religious 
producers seek to optimize some measure of organizational success like members or 
resources (e.g. financial, political, or social capital) while competing with each other.  
Religious consumers seek to fulfill their varied religious needs.  The behaviors of 
religious leaders and churches are modeled as rational responses to opportunities and 
constraints found within the religious market (Iannaccone and Berman, 2006).  The 
successful religious producer is the one that "competes well" and provides an attractive 
religious product in exchange for "time, money, and commitment" (Roof, 1999). 
 Finke and Starke (2005) chronicle the religious history and the growth of 
denominations in the United States in terms of religious markets.  One of the 
characteristics of the religious environment in America is intense competition since there 
is no established national religion (Finke and Starke, 2005).  The lack of a state religion 
serves to explain the pluralistic nature of the religious market place in America from its 
inception.  Finke and Starke (2005) use the term “entrepreneurial religion” to describe 
churches and clergy that engage in innovative activities to reach people.  However, not all 
churches and clergy possess entrepreneurial characteristics which contribute to achieving 
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objectives related to the mission.  The authors illustrate that there are distinct 
characteristics of churches and clergy that are “winners and losers in a free market 
religious environment” by applying a church-sect typology, an organizational 
development model, developed by Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch (Niebuhr, 1929). 
 Churches normally do not begin as institutional structures but more as faith 
movements on the fringes of religion.  Sects are those groups that are in high tension with 
the social-cultural environment.  Persons drawn to sects seek a faith that is strict and 
otherworldly while those in churches do not want such features.  According to Niebuhr 
(1929), church congregants prefer a more accommodating faith that allows members to 
operate in a relationship of low-tension with the environment.  Sects bear the character of 
voluntary associations while churches are established institutions. 
 Niebuhr (1929) asserts that the sectarian type of organization remains present for 
only one generation.  Successful sects transform into established churches as children are 
born and the sect takes on the role of a socializing institution training the second 
generation in the discipline and norms of the tradition.  The former sect begins to 
accommodate to societal norms in its ethical stance decreasing the environmental cultural 
tension.  As the former sect becomes a church, some members may perceive “mission 
drift” resulting in a schism within the church body.  The faction that secedes births a new 
sect and the process begins again. 
  In the religious marketplace, sects and churches compete for religious market 
share.  Finke and Starke (2005) describe how established churches employed “cartel 
agreements” which served as barriers to entry to sects.  For example, in 1801 the 
Presbyterians and the Congregationalists created a Plan of Union for western expansion 
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where they had “noncompeting missionary efforts” for access to exclusive markets.  
However, the upstart sects employed vigorous marketing techniques (e.g. revivals) to 
draw consumers away from the churches.  As religious groups supplied innovative 
religious products, they experienced success in the religious market (Roof, 1999). 
 The success of the sects was attributed to their ability to meet the differentiated 
religious preferences of the American frontier.  The winners, as described by Finke and 
Starke, were the Methodists and the Baptists and the losers were the Presbyterians and 
the Congregationalists.  According to the researchers, the Methodists and the Baptists in 
the 1800’s had an organizational structure that was suited for growth and accumulation of 
market share.  The Methodist and Baptist clergy were not from the educated classes.  
Their leadership was “home grown.” 
 The educational requirement of the Presbyterians and the Congregationalists 
created a labor supply problem.  Well-educated clergy have higher costs associated with 
their employment and their deployment.  The low overhead costs associated with 
establishing churches gave the Methodists and the Baptists a distinct advantage.  In 
addition, having local preachers decreased the social distance between parson and 
parishioner.  Members felt they could relate better to a minister who was one of their 
own. 
 Consistent with the sect-church model, the successful Methodist sect became the 
Methodist Church.  As a result, the denomination began to experience a membership 
decline and a loss of market share, as the local democratic form of local preachers gave 
way to a centralized clerical hierarchy with an increasingly affluent membership and 
professionalized clergy (Finke and Starke, 2005).  The membership decline of mainline 
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protestant denominations since the 1960’s is well documented (McKinney and Finke, 
2002). 
 The United Methodist Church experienced a decline of 7.0% during the 1980’s 
alone from 9,519,407 members to 8,853,455 members (General Commission on Archives 
and History, 2009).  The decline continued into the 21st century as the 2008 membership 
was reported as 7,853,987 (National Council of Churches, 2010).  Nonetheless, during 
the 1990’s clergy salaries rose 5% overall and 10% (figures adjusted for inflation) in the 
southeastern U.S. outpacing inflation (McMillan and Price, 2001). 
1.2 Executive Compensation 
 Because of American sentiments about money and what it represents (Hacker, 
1997), there is no more contentious subject than that of executive compensation.  
Scholars suggest that pay serves several functions.  Salary has a motivational effect and 
serves as an incentive that affects decisions made and strategies adopted by business 
leaders, both of which affect firm performance (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).  
Remuneration is an indicator of value for executives.  Pay is a means for employees to 
realize rewards for their efforts.  In a for-profit context, executives and other employees 
can participate in the firm’s profitability.  Therefore, when an executive makes sound 
decisions and engages in profitable strategies, the executive and the organization are 
financially rewarded. 
 If executives are utility maximizers, as economic theory suggests (Ross, 1973), 
then compensation also serves as an evaluation indicator for executives as they weigh 
their own personal risks, cost-benefits, and time horizons (Finkelstein and Boyd, 1998).  
Managers weigh the level of compensation in a given organization in light of 
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compensation in other organizations, personal goals, both financial and intrinsic, and time 
to retirement.  Salary levels may also affect stakeholder perceptions of the firm by 
suggesting that the firm is operated well by capable leadership, who by virtue of their 
competence, are deserving of the pay or that the firm is inefficient with workers who are 
overpaid. 
 Executive compensation for the nonprofit is viewed somewhat differently.  For 
nonprofits, wages are weighed against applying the organization's resources to the 
mission more explicitly than in the for-profit context.  It is difficult for a nonprofit 
organization to justify large remuneration to its executives when, as mandated by its tax-
exempt status under section 501(c) of the tax code, it cannot distribute profits to 
individuals (Hansmann, 1987). 
 The tax-exempt classification serves as an indicator that the organization serves 
public purposes rather than personal interests (Salamon, 2002).  A salary level deemed 
appropriate in a for-profit context might not be viewed as appropriate in a nonprofit 
context because it signals self-interest or a diversion of the organization’s resources from 
the mission (Leete, 2006; Young, 1984).  Because of their role as bearers of the public 
trust, nonprofit organizations are expected to behave differently from their for-profit 
counterparts.  The religious context is particularly sensitive to the issue of handling 
money because resources do not belong to individuals but are managed as a stewardship 
(Wuthnow, 1997). 
 Stewardship defines the relationship between not only the believer and the Divine, 
but also the relationship between the believer and material possessions (Wuthnow, 1997).  
A stewardship perspective subscribes to a supposed distinction between the natural and 
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divine order (Wuthnow, 1994) where the pursuit of material goods conflicts with 
accomplishing divine aims.  In this view, a good steward is one who uses material 
resources for higher ends and shuns personal self-interest.  Religious nonprofits therefore, 
as it relates to finances, are in a double-bind of being both nonprofit and religious and are 
held to an even higher standard of accountability and scrutiny. 
 Churches, like many other nonprofits, must face what Salamon refers to as the 
human resource challenge (Salamon, 2002).  There has been a consistent decline over the 
last generation in persons choosing to enter the ranks of the clergy (Chaves, 2002).  Some 
scholars assert that the inability to recruit talented and qualified leaders is because of the 
inability of churches to pay adequate compensation to clergy (McMillan and Price, 2001; 
Chaves, 2002; Chaves, 2004).   
 The clergy labor market has both a supply and a demand side.  On the supply-
side, clergy enter the market by demonstrating a “calling” (Perl and Chang, 2000; Oden, 
1983).  The demand-side of the clergy labor market is defined by the congregational or 
denominational polity.  The demand for clergy is met by the local church’s hiring process 
or by a denominational hierarchy’s appointive process.  Religious organizations have a 
process, either formal or informal, by which the call is legitimized and clergy are 
credentialed for congregational leadership. 
 Clergy overall, with a few exceptions, have experienced a consistent decline in 
real income since the late 1960’s and are losing competitiveness relative to other 
professionals (Hudnut-Beumler, 1999, McMillan and Price, 2003).  Hudnut-Beumler 
(1999) offered several explanations.  Clergy experienced a decline in status as they were 
"de-centered" from a prominent position among cultural elites.  Hudnut-Beumler 
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highlighted ideological arguments where clergy became less distinguished as a vocational 
class.  Vatican II made the priesthood less "special" as the priesthood of all believers, 
where the view that each Christian was a minister, was espoused.  The implication was 
that if all were ministers, then what was distinctive about the clergy separating them from 
the laity.  Further, clergy seemed no longer willing to bear the weight as "arbiters of 
moral and theological truth".  In essence, according to Hudnut-Beumler (1999), clergy 
were co-conspirators in their own devaluation. 
 There is an alternative explanation.  Religious production is difficult to quantify 
and subsequently difficult to evaluate.  Since many persons are unaware of the activities 
of a pastor (McMillan, 2002), it is difficult to assess the value of the work.  Further, if 
Hudnut Beumler (1999) is correct in the perception among Christians that all are 
ministers, the implication is that anyone can perform ministerial tasks.  The risk is that 
the work will be undervalued since clergy cannot justify a higher wage for their efforts 
and consumers of religious services will seek out lower priced substitutes. 
 Some may view the discounted salary as part of the call similar to the “donative 
labor hypothesis” in nonprofit theory, public-service motivation,, or "psychic income" 
where persons receive non-pecuniary benefits for their work (Hatt, 1950; Leete, 2006; 
Bright, 2009).  Iannaccone and Berman (2006) suggest that low wages are a means of 
reducing fraud in religious institutions.  The clergy are more convincing when they do 
not prosper materially from the believers’ faith and when the salaries are low compared 
to the clergy’s skill level.  An alternative explanation is that since religion is a vocation-
based sector, the low salaries serve as a screening device for unsuitable candidates 
(Heyes, 2005).  Consequently, increased wages would decrease the number of clergy who 
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have a true calling and attract persons without a vocation.  Bonifield and Mills (1980) 
state that low salaries are a result of clergy serving churches where their work is not 
valued because of the perceived availability of substitutes. 
 Low clergy salaries in the Protestant context have historical precedents in at least 
two religious traditions: Roman Catholicism and Judaism.  The Roman Catholic clergy 
vow of poverty (Finke, 1997) associated with religious orders which symbolized humility 
and a disaffection for worldly material goods, in a practical sense, served to reduce the 
costs of labor for a given diocese.  In Jewish tradition, the Mishnah warned scholars 
against using the Torah for material gain (Roth, 1997).  Knowledge of holy writ was for 
the glory of God and the benefit of the people and not for amassing personal wealth.  
Clergy are viewed as a group in much the same way that people are grouped in society 
(Wilder, 1978) (e.g. class, gender, race, and orientation).  The ramification is that an 
economic prescription imposed on one group of clergy impacts other clergy.  
 The subject of executive compensation for clergy is compelling for several 
reasons.  Religious congregations hold a prominent place in American society.  There are 
over 300,000 houses of worship in the United States (Chaves, 2002), representing a 
multiplicity of faiths.  The National Council of Churches (2006), an ecumenical Christian 
organization in the U.S., reported that its membership included 105,421 congregations 
representing 44,154,806 members and 80,062 pastors, not including clients and 
constituents.   
 In the United States, religious congregations hold a privileged status among 
nonprofit organizations because they automatically receive tax-exemption (Anheier, 
2005).  The Internal Revenue Code considers advancing religion as a charitable purpose.  
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Religious organizations and houses of worship that receive charitable donations are 
classified as 501(c)3 and are exempt from federal taxation (IRS, 2009).  Further, the 
government does not impose its reporting requirements on congregations because of the 
interpretation of the constitutional mandate for separation of church and state (Anheier, 
2005). 
 As nonprofit organizations, churches and their leaders are subject to the “non-
distribution constraint” (Steinberg, 2006; Hansmann, 1987).  One of the tests to qualify as 
a nonprofit is that the entity must show that the organization’s assets and amassed 
surpluses may not be distributed, except for fair compensation, to the benefit of members, 
managers, or founders (Anheier, 2005).  According to Giving USA 2009, religious giving 
in 2008 was 106.89 billion dollars representing 35% of all charitable giving.  Since 
houses of worship garner the lion's share of charitable contributions it is imperative that 
churches expend funds according to the tax code and are held accountable.   
 The subject of nonprofit accountability spans several topics including internal 
governance issues, fiscal probity, self-inurement, mission drift, and effectiveness (Brody, 
2002).  The idea of self-inurement (i.e. personally benefiting from the organization’s 
resources) is at the core of the arguments pertaining to nonprofit executive compensation.  
Deliberations concerning money are not neutral affairs (Hacker, 1997).  Our curiosity 
wants an accounting of why a salary is comparatively high or low from our own point of 
view.  Because very little is understood as to how ministerial wages are determined there 
is the danger of misinterpreting what a high or low salary means.  Understanding the 
underlying assumptions of clergy compensation and the inter-relationship between 
factors that contribute to clergy salary levels will help to increase accountability. 
12 
 
 Accountability is a process where organizations are held responsible for 
performance and behavior within a particular environmental context (Young, 2002).  
Nonprofit accountability is a complex and difficult subject because of the competing and 
sometimes conflicting demands of stakeholders (Brody, 2002).  Nonprofits do not have 
owners in the same sense as for-profits.  Shareholders own for-profit organizations by 
virtue of capital participation through stock.  In contrast, nonprofits have stakeholders.  A 
stakeholder is anyone who can make a claim, real or imagined, on the organization 
(Anheier, 2005).  
 Stakeholders are both inside and external to the organization.  Internal 
stakeholders include paid and unpaid staff, managers, clients, donors, and the board.  The 
government and its representatives, the nonprofit sector, the media, and the public as a 
whole, represent some of the external stakeholders to whom the nonprofit is accountable 
in some way.  Ideally, the board of directors functions on behalf of the stakeholders by 
governing the activities of the nonprofit, ensuring fiscal probity and mission attainment.  
However, each group within the multiplicity of stakeholders may view accountability 
differently (Brody, 2002). 
 As the public calls for increasing accountability on the part of nonprofits, one of 
the first areas to be examined is executive compensation.  Similarly, when a church falls 
under public scrutiny the salary of the pastor is called into question.  As public-serving 
entities, churches and clergy are not exempt from examination in matters of 
compensation. 
 This paper builds on previous clergy compensation, nonprofit wage setting, and 
organizational theory and research, and studies the churches of the North Georgia Annual 
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Conference of the United Methodist Church.  This investigation considers a variety of 
factors including human capital, personal characteristics, organizational factors, religious 
market competition, clergy labor markets, and the principal-agent relationship.  These 
factors are of interest because of their applicability specifically to the church context in 
the determination of clergy executive compensation.   
 Overall, this thesis offers a framework and tests a theory for clergy executive 
compensation which encompasses the following constructs.  Previous clergy 
compensation research grounds the investigation in agency theory (Zech, 2007).  Agency 
theory, or principal-agent theory, assumes there is a misalignment between the interests 
of self-serving managers (agents) who, without appropriate monitoring and reward 
arrangements (contracts), will shirk their duties to the firm (the principal) (Ross, 1973; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  When principal-agent theory is 
applied to the local church and clergy, in its simplest form, the church is the principal and 
the clergy is the agent.  In the case of churches affiliated with a denominational 
hierarchy, clergy are the agents of an additional principal, the denomination.  The dual 
agency relationship creates a dyadic tension for clergy that affects their salary levels.    
 Ministerial salaries are determined within a specific congregational context.  For 
example, American congregations function with a specific polity, they are located within 
different communities, and their membership sizes differ.  Clergy may function in a solo 
pastorate or as a part of a ministerial team.   
 Like other workers, clergy possess certain characteristics that may be valuable to 
an employer.  Rewards are expected for investment in human capital.  Similarly, personal 
characteristics may also be of benefit to a worker and increase wages.  Unfortunately, due 
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to gender and racial biases, other personal characteristics may result in lower salaries 
across a given sample.   
 Do all clergy compete against each other in an open labor market?  Many clergy 
compete only against ministers from their denomination.  Further, the denominational 
market is generally limited by geography (e.g. states, region, or an annual conference) 
although transfers do occur.  Within an Annual Conference, the basic unit of governance 
for the United Methodist Church in a geographic area, there are thirteen different 
categories of clergy based on their conference relationship.  Conference relationship is 
determined primarily by ordination status.  Ordination is a religious rite signifying that a 
person is an authorized representative of the faith (Campbell, 1988).  Ordination also 
signals a labor commitment to the denomination as well as the annual conference, and 
creates a stratified labor market where clergy compete for positions.   
 The present analysis also seeks to account for the variance in salaries among 
upper-stratum (ordained) and lower-stratum (non-ordained) clergy members of the North 
Georgia Annual Conference.  The determinants of compensation in one stratum may not 
be significant in another stratum.  For example, tenure or experience may be significant 
in the case of ordained clergy as opposed to non-ordained clergy.   
 In order to investigate these constructs, this study employs several academic 
disciplines and a multiple-lens strategy for theory development (Sabatier, 1999).  
According to Sabatier (1999), it is imperative that theorists demonstrate the ability to 
employ differing theoretical perspectives in their work.  Applying multiple lenses 
requires theorists to acknowledge the assumptions, boundaries, and shortcomings of 
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particular theories.  Theories are not universal in their application.  Some theories work 
better under certain circumstances than others.   
 Sociologists have traditionally studied ministers and churches examining clergy 
attitudes and the role of religion in society (Bonifield and Mills, 1980).  This study goes 
beyond traditional sociology to encompass organizational studies, nonprofit research, 
religious studies, public policy, and labor market economics.  There are also applications 
for this research in communities outside the academy. 
 This study also has implications beyond the religious context as well.  For 
example, the government has an interest in the salaries of clergy.  In its monitoring role, 
the government cannot allow nonprofits to violate the nondistribution constraint.  Beyond 
the monitoring role, government-nonprofit relations have been extended to houses of 
worship because of the Faith-Based Initiative (Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life, 
2003).  As principals, when engaging in public-private partnerships with churches, the 
government has an interest in knowing that its agents will contribute to the public's 
interest and not their own self-interest. 
 The plan of the paper is as follows.  Chapter Two provides a survey of the 
pertinent literature in order to place the executive compensation framework in the context 
of previous scholarly work.  Chapter Three describes a proposed clergy compensation 
framework, the data, the variables, and the empirical model for investigating the 
determinants relating to clergy salaries.  Chapter Four explains the results of the model 
and the findings with respect to the foregoing constructs.  The investigation concludes 
with Chapter Five devoted to discussion, policy implications, limitations, and next steps 




LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 This chapter addresses several goals.  First, the chapter demonstrates how the 
scholarship utilized to explain the existence and development of the nonprofit sector 
applies directly to churches.  Third, the literature review illustrates how churches and 
clergy are similar to other organizational forms and their workers.  Fourth, the survey 
highlights the empirical similarities found in the nonprofit executive and clergy 
compensation literatures.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of the factors that 
contribute to ministerial pay in previous clergy compensation research.   
2.1 The Church and Nonprofit Organizational Research 
 Religious organizations provided the foundations for early American society and 
the nonprofit sector (Anheier, 2005).  Although churches and religious nonprofits have 
operated as a part of the American landscape for centuries, little scholarship exists which 
links them to the nonprofit sector, e.g. examines churches from the nonprofit perspective 
(Cadge and Wuthnow, 2006).  This dearth of research is intriguing since research 
traditionally applied to nonprofit organizations transfers easily to the study of religious 
organizations.   
 Cadge and Wuthnow (2006) observe that some scholars subscribe to the view of 
secularization wherein religious participation is soon to be decreasing in American 
society, while others (Chaves, 1994) assert that the historical role of religion is changing 
as persons affiliate with specialized organizations besides religious ones.  The advent of 
Charitable Choice, the legislation permitting religious organizations to compete for 
public funding for providing social services, and the extension of the White House Office 
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of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives highlight the significance of identifying 
churches as not merely religious institutions, but also as service-providing religious 
nonprofits and applying nonprofit scholarship to the study of such organizations. 
 How does nonprofit theory apply to churches?  Previous scholars have understood 
nonprofit organizations in terms of three failures: market failure, government failure, and 
contract failure (Steinberg, 2006).  These theories also provide a rationale for the role of 
churches in providing religious goods. 
 In classical theory, markets seek to provide goods and services at an optimal 
efficient level where marginal benefits are just offset by marginal costs and production 
efficiency is assumed (Steinberg, 2006).  Market failure occurs where there are 
externalities, economies of scale, public goods or other conditions inhibiting efficient 
levels of production.   
 Markets operate best in the provision of private goods where consumption is 
limited to paying customers.  We have seen for-profit firms enter into certain nonprofit 
realms like hospitals and education yet there is no evidence of “for-profit” churches in the 
sense of a for-profit business although some churches may be more "business-like" in the 
pejorative sense focusing more on the market than achieving the mission.   
 Weisbrod’s public goods theory provides insight into the existence of religious 
nonprofits, e.g churches, in the United States (Weisbrod, 1977).  The inability or 
unwillingness of the government to provide all goods or services for which demand 
exceeds marginal costs is termed “government failure” (Steinberg, 2006).  In Weisbrod’s 
view, nonprofits provide public goods in cases where the government cannot or will not 
provide them.  The government will provide goods consistent with preferences at the 
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demand level of the median voter, satisfying a majority of the population demanding 
public and quasi-public goods.  However, appealing to the median voter alone will not 
satisfy all existing demand.  Unmet demand results from demand heterogeneity or 
diversity of preferences.  Further, since there are constitutional restrictions that prevent 
the government’s provision or sponsorship of religious activity in the United States 
(Anheier, 2005), although there are examples of state-sponsored religion elsewhere,  
churches and other religious organizations address the unmet preferences for religious 
public goods. 
 Nonprofits also arise because of contract failure (Steinberg, 2006).  Under 
circumstances where service quality cannot be easily evaluated, consumers will choose a 
nonprofit service provider they deem more trustworthy because of the absence of the 
profit motive (Hansmann, 1987).  In such cases, there are information asymmetries where 
the seller knows more about the quality of the service than the buyer (Anheier, 2005).  
The usual contract mechanisms, found in market transactions, fail because of the 
accompanying monitoring costs associated with governing the contracting and evaluating 
the service provided.  In the case of religious goods, it is difficult for parishioners to 
monitor the activities of clergy and churches related to religious goods production and 
assess the quality of such services. 
 Religion, in America, has been viewed historically as a public good (Anderson, 
1988; Lipford, et.al., 1993).  Public goods have two distinct characteristics, non-
excludability and non-rivalry (Anheier, 2005).  The public good attribute of religion is 
that there is benefit to the community from the presence of a religious populace because 
of the espoused values of many religions of being of service to humanity.  The advantage 
19 
 
to society of healthy religion is non-excludable and non-rival.  Drawing on the nonprofit 
theory, the public good nature of religion serves as a deterrent to for-profit firms and 
government entering into religious goods production.   
 Public goods theory is insufficient by itself to explain the existence of churches 
and religious nonprofit because religious goods have private aspects.  Buchanan defines 
club goods as goods that are not purely private or purely public (Buchanan, 1965).  
Hansmann’s prior work examined social clubs and found them to be an exception to 
contract failure theory.  In the case of country clubs, the patrons were able to judge the 
quality of the services.  The nonprofit form allowed the consumers to have control over 
the enterprise.  The exception resulted in consumer control theory.  As in the case of the 
country club, there are also social determinants accompanying church affiliation.  
Niebuhr (1929) observed that social aspirations and affinity serve to define church 
membership much like a social club. 
 According to Sandler and Tschirhart (1997), a club shares the following 
characteristics.  Clubs are voluntary.  They are formed for mutual benefit.  Clubs share 
production costs, common member characteristics, an excludable good, or a combination 
of one or more of these elements (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997).  Through the form of 
the club, an institution can limit access to the good by others and impose costs, both 
pecuniary and otherwise, for its use (Sandler and Tschirhart, 1997).   
 Nonprofit organizations are structurally diverse.  Hansmann (1987) categorizes 
nonprofits on the basis of revenue source and control.  Donative nonprofits are those who 
receive the bulk of their revenues from donations, while commercial nonprofits are 
funded by fees-for-service and the sale of goods.  In the case where the locus of control, 
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the ability to elect the firm’s governing body, is in the hands of the patrons, Hansmann 
refers to such organizations as mutual nonprofits.  Entrepreneurial nonprofits, in contrast, 
operate with a self-perpetuating board.  According to Hansmann’s typology categorizing 
nonprofit firms, churches fall into the category of “donative mutual” nonprofits 
(Hansmann, 1987). 
 Churches are voluntary membership organizations (Chaves, 2004).  As a donative 
mutual nonprofit, with few exceptions, the control is in the hands of the members.  
Consumer control theory (Hansmann, 1987) applies to the case of religious congregations 
in that patrons adopt the nonprofit form in an effort to ensure control over the work 
(Hansmann, 1987).  Churches are customer-controlled firms in as much as members 
provide the revenues through offerings and serve on the governing board.  As such, 
churches may be viewed as religious nonprofit clubs (Klick, 2006).   
 Estelle James (1987) suggests that the classical economic theories for the 
existence of nonprofits ignore their religious origins.  In contrast, she posits demand and 
supply-side explanations for the existence of the nonprofit sector.  Although James’s 
research focuses on nonprofit firms outside of the American context, her analysis has 
implications for understanding the role played by American religious congregations. 
 On the demand-side, James addresses two elements: excess demand and 
differentiated demand (1987).  According to the theory of excess demand, private 
voluntary firms will provide the production of quasi-public goods when there is limited 
government supply.  James then addresses the question of limited supply on the part of 
government.  She theorizes about the needs of the unmet demanders.  Since the 
government will only supply goods at the level of the median voter, what then happens to 
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the demand preferences of the minority?  James proposes that the median voter theory 
falls short of addressing inequities in political power.  Her contribution is that in cases 
when there is a high degree of variability in the perceived costs and benefits of 
government provided quasi-public goods and services, a private voluntary sector will 
emerge to address the excess demand of the underrepresented and disempowered (1987). 
 Differentiated demand reflects the type of service rather than the amount of 
service provision.  Several differentiating factors would contribute to the growth of a 
private sector providing goods and services (James, 1987).  If the preferences were 
deeply held due to religious or cultural differences, then the private sector would grow 
due to the heterogeneous demand.  Additional cases occur where the government is 
constrained to provide a homogeneous product, where government due to geographic 
dispersion cannot meet the diversity of tastes efficiently, or the dominant group in the 
culture cannot enforce their preferences leaving private production as an option.  
Churches, as suggested by James, address the varying and intense product requirements 
characteristic of religious pluralism. 
 James (1987) also provides a supply-side rationale for the emergence of nonprofit 
service provision.  Among her explanations is religious motivation.  Ideologues are 
value-based entrepreneurs that gravitate toward the nonprofit sector (Anheier, 2005).  
James (1987, 1989) sees nonprofits as organizations that promote socialization and group 
identification.  As such, entrepreneurs will develop organizations that provide services to 
a particular group while promoting their own values.  Gill (2001) describes churches as 
“proselytizing religious firms” that operate as “faith maximizers” seeking to win as many 
faith-adherents as they can.  For example, parochial schools provide not only education, 
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but also religious indoctrination as proselytizing religious organizations seeking 
constituents. 
 Church denominations are similar to other firms as described by Coase (1937).  
The firm serves as an organized basic unit of production that weighs costs and benefits in 
the production of goods and services.  Organizing a firm is more efficient than enacting 
individual contracts for each transaction when monitoring the multiplicity of individual 
contracts is cost prohibitive. 
 Coase states that organizations save on transaction costs when an authority directs 
the resources.  Firms become larger with the addition of transactions.  Additional 
transactions, then, cause the firm to incur more costs.  Denominations form by organizing 
local churches into a system of relationships in order to deliver a product with lower 
transaction costs.  The organizational form of choice, for monopolists, is often the 
federated / franchise system (Young and Faulk, 2010).  In their investigation, Young and 
Faulk (2010) characterize nonprofit franchises along two dimensions: 1) the relationship 
between the main body and the affiliated groups and 2) the degree of homogeneity among 
the associated organizations.  Central organization control can range from a decentralized 
support role to an arrangement where the locus of control rests with the central body.  
Affiliate groups can vary from uniform to diverse in terms of homogeneity. 
 Applying a franchise model to churches is not novel.  In Wealth of Nations, Adam 
Smith likened the medieval church to a corporate franchise (Anderson, 1988).  In the case 
of denominational churches, the denomination attempts to strike a balance between 
homogeneous affiliates that operate in the same manner and heterogeneous affiliates that 
apply different methods based on community needs (Young and Faulk, 2010).  As a 
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system, the local church and the denomination employ the same symbols, resources, and 
share a common identity. 
 The denomination must also strike a balance in terms of its authority.  As in the 
Young and Faulk taxonomy, control is balanced although it is under the auspices of a 
centralized authority.  For example, in the United Methodist church, the central body, the 
denomination, does not fully control the local church because although the 
denominational structure deploys and appoints clergy leadership through its 
representative the bishop, the churches pay apportionments, e.g. franchise fees or taxes 
(Oster, 1992), to the denomination and governs itself at the local level.  Essentially, the 
denomination operates as a rent seeker from the downstream local church.  It is in the 
denomination's best interest, regardless of denominational structure, to deploy clergy 
leadership, e.g. franchise operators, who are amenable to the congregation and will 
ensure that the franchise fees are paid.    
2.2 Executive Compensation Literature 
 An extensive literature exists on executive compensation outside of the religious 
sector (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  In Figure 2.1, Barkema and Gomez-Mejia 
(1998) presents a general framework for executive compensation determinants in the for-
profit context.  This framework provides a point of departure for the present study yet 
does not fully transfer to the religious context.  For example, in the compensation box, 
the long-term orientation refers to equity participation for for-profit executives who may 
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Figure 2.1 A General Framework for Executive Compensation 
 
 
 The majority of for-profit executive compensation research focuses on the link 
between pay and performance.  Linking compensation to financial performance is a 
difficult matter.  What types of measures are relevant?  Should the organization use 
accounting performance measures that affect cash compensation or stock performance 
that relates to stock options as compensation (Pavlik, et.al. 1993)?  In the for-profit 
context, some authors suggest using the measure of company profits as a percentage of 
sales, profit, market equity value, revenue, and firm size as a function of sales and 
revenue (Deckop, 1988).  Others focus solely on the creation of shareholder value 
through stock prices.  However, how to measure economic value is in dispute (Bacidore, 
et. al., 1997). 
 In a meta-analysis of 105 executive compensation studies that attempted to find a 
link between pay, firm size, and performance, Tosi, Werner, Katz, and Gomez-Mejia 
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(1997) found four main determinants of for-profit executive salaries: absolute firm size, 
changes in firm size, financial performance, and changes in financial performance 
(Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997).  However, other factors may influence executive 
wages. 
 Ezzamel and Watson (1998) suggest that CEO's are paid a market rate for their 
labor.  The challenge is in defining the market and identifying a "comparison other" as an 
external point of reference.  Peer compensation, using comparable roles as a measure, 
effects CEO pay. 
 A dominant theoretical formulation for executive compensation studies is agency 
theory.  An agency problem arises when an actor, the principal, enlists the services of 
another, an agent, to operate on behalf of the principal in decision-making (Ross, 1973).  
The problem assumes conflict between the goals of the principal and agent and 
information asymmetry where the principal cannot, or without incurring great expense, 
monitor the activities of the agent.  Additionally, the principal and agent may have 
different risk preferences resulting in a lack of alignment in decision-making (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  A firm's ownership structure influences executive compensation. 
   Firm governance is not limited to the influence of the board of directors.  
Governance includes the effects of the media and the public writ large, remuneration 
committees, and the market for corporate control (Barkema and Gomez-Mejia, 1998).  
When persons from outside the firm are in the majority of those serving on a 
compensation committee or board of directors, salaries are comparably lower (Conyon 
and Peck, 1998).   
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 An explanation for salary determinants is also found in human capital theory.  
Human capital has been used to explain the relationship between salary levels and firm 
size because human capital attributes are needed to manage larger and more complex 
organizations (Gomez-Mejia and Wiseman, 1997).  Human capital refers to an 
individual’s capacity to produce and perform tasks (Schultz, 1962).  Human capital 
theory stands on the proposition that people enhance their capabilities through self-
investment.  Consequently, earning differentials reflect those payoffs to investments in 
human capital.  Spence (1973) asserts that human capital serves as a signal in the job 
market potentially predicting productivity.   
 In contrast, personal characteristics like age, race, and gender are not subject to 
manipulation.  Although both human capital and personal characteristics transmit 
information to employers that speak to desirability as employees, they are not the same.  
Spence (1973) views human capital as signals and personal characteristics as indices.  
Employees employ a signaling strategy as they make decisions about self-enhancement.  
Indices are a given which are also taken into consideration by employers.  The difference 
between signals and indices is that human capital is alterable, while indices are 
unchangeable factors.   
  According to Becker (1962), there are several ways to invest in human capital 
including education and job experience.  In his treatment of on-the-job-training, Becker 
differentiates between general training and specific training.  General training increases 
the marginal productivity of the trainee for many firms, not only for the firm that 
provided the training.  Specific training favors the organization that administers the 
training.  Becker observes that most training is neither completely general nor completely 
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specific.  Whether the training is specific or general, it benefits strong monopsonists 
because laborers have fewer alternative employment opportunities under monopsony. 
 Becker’s analysis of specific training has several implications.  There is the risk of 
labor turnover for firms even in monopsonistic labor markets.  In order to reduce the risk, 
Becker asserts that rational firms will pay higher wages to employees after it has trained 
them as a means of sharing on the return from training and as an effort to retain trained 
workers.  Generally trained employees will continue to receive lower wages than 
specifically trained workers.  Employees with specific training would be less likely to 
quit and employers would be less likely to dismiss them. 
 Weisbrod (1962) observes a strong positive relationship between earning levels 
and education.  He also notes the benefits of receiving additional education.  A person 
with education beyond high school also has expanded employment options.  In addition 
to more job choices, Weisbrod claims that an educated person will seek employment with 
non-pecuniary rewards and may sacrifice monetary compensation. 
2.3 Nonprofit Executive Compensation Research 
 The role of a ministerial leader of a church parish is analogous to the job of an 
executive director of a nonprofit.  Aside from the religious aspect, the organization is a 
mission-maximizing nonprofit.  Nonprofit wage research, therefore, is applicable and 
contributes to the development of our theory of clergy executive compensation.   
 Young (1984) analyzed nonprofit wages, addressing the following research 
questions. 1) Is there a substantial difference in nonprofit compensation between sectors?  
What accounts for the differences? 2) Are the sectoral differences substantial for different 
classes of employees?  Young found that nonprofit workers are paid less than their 
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counterparts generally speaking.  However, within industries, the evidence is mixed 
suggesting other factors at work. 
 Weisbrod (1983) studied the pay differential between nonprofit and for-profit 
lawyers.  He concluded that nonprofit lawyers have different preference structures that 
lead them to accept substantially lower wages than their equally qualified for-profit 
counterparts.  Weisbrod’s finding supports the “donative labor hypothesis” where the 
good produced is perceived to be different or of higher quality than the comparable for-
profit good; therefore, the worker is willing to donate the cost of labor in exchange for 
participating in a noble enterprise of greater public benefit (Leete, 2006).  Weisbrod was 
the first to support a commonly held notion that nonprofit workers will do similar work  
as persons in a for-profit context at a discount.   
 Preston (1989) came to a similar conclusion stating that nonprofit workers 
seeking to provide goods with positive externalities will accept lower wages.  Oster 
(1998), drawing upon the work of Young (1984), concurred by asserting that nonprofits 
provide non-monetary benefits to workers in lieu of financial compensation.  However, 
Leete (2001) found only slight differences in wages across the economy between for-
profit and nonprofit workers.  Other scholars found that nonprofit salaries are comparable 
with market wages while apparent differences exist, however, at the occupational and 
industry level (Ruhm and Borkowski, 2003). 
 Wage differentials can also be partially explained by the theory of compensating 
differentials (Leete, 2006).  According to the theory, workers who have specialized skills, 
skills that are complex or expensive to attain, or who work under undesirable conditions 
will earn more.  On the other hand, those workers with easily attained skills and 
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preferable working conditions will earn less.  Comparisons of nonprofit and for-profit 
wages that do not take into account the differences in industry, occupation, or the 
characteristics of individual workers, tend to report that nonprofit workers earn less than 
for-profit workers (Leete, 2006). 
 Nonprofit executive compensation research, summarized in Table A.3 (see 
Appendix A), suggests several factors that contribute to executive salaries.  Most scholars 
propose that organizational size is important (Oster, 1998; Frumkin and Keating, 2001; 
Twombly and Gantz, 2001; Hallock, 2002; Gray and Benson, 2003); however, the 
measures of size vary.  Most scholars use assets as a measure of size.  Some use total 
assets (Oster, 1998; Frumkin and Keating, 2001; Twombly and Gantz, 2001; Gray and 
Benson, 2003) while others use net assets (Hallock, 2002). 
 Organizational complexity also positively impacts executive salaries (Gray and 
Benson, 2003; Twombly and Harvey, 2007).  Twombly and Harvey (2007) measure 
organizational complexity by revenue diversification.  Research suggests that 
organizations that operate with multiple revenue streams may be more administratively 
and financially complex than groups that rely on single funding sources (Gronbjerg 
1993).  Gray and Benson (2003) utilize total assets as a proxy for organizational 
complexity assuming that larger organizations are more complex. 
 Financial strength and variability in revenue streams is also a strong determinant 
according to researchers (Oster, 1998; Frumkin and Keating 2001; Twombly and Gantz, 
2001; Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006; Twombly and Harvey, 2007).  Some 
scholars believe that fiscal health ratios are important in the nonprofit sector as signals to 
stakeholders of organizational viability and sustainability (Tuckman and Chang, 1991; 
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Greenlee and Trussel, 2000; Trussel 2002).1  Therefore, an organization with strong 
financial indicators will reward the executive leader accordingly. 
 An organization that is more dependent on private donations, rather than public 
funding or fees, will have lower salaries because of board concerns over public image 
and stakeholder concerns over the diversion of resources (Oster, 1998).  Twombly and 
Gantz (2001) observe that in the religious, environmental, and higher education 
organizations, a greater dependency on charitable donations decreases salaries perhaps as 
a signal of fiscal restraint to donors.  In the presence of monitoring mechanisms 
administered by the grantor, organizations receiving government grants receive more pay 
(Hallock, 2002).   
 Some researchers suggest that executives are rewarded in accordance with 
measures that assess how well the nonprofit achieves its mission (Baber, Daniel, and 
Roberts, 2002; Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006).  Positive revenue increases are a 
signal of mission attainment (Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman 2006).  Baber, Daniel, and 
Roberts (2002) found that the changes in executive compensation are positively affected 
by the changes in the amounts spent on programs and the degree to which the programs 
are monitored by an oversight agency. 
 Other scholars have studied a link between pay and performance in nonprofit 
executive compensation (Gray and Benson, 2003; Twombly and Harvey, 2007; Mesch 
and Rooney, 2008).  Mesch and Rooney (2008) studied nonprofit fundraisers and found a 
strong positive pay for performance link as measured by the revenues garnered for the 
organization.  In contrast, Harvey and Twombly (2007), who measured performance 
                                                 
1 These studies address financial health apart from executive compensation. 
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using financial indicators, found the financial measures had little impact on executive 
wages. 
 Cultural factors within a given context impact the size of the CEO pay package 
(Oster, 1998; Gray and Benson, 2003).  Oster (1998) found that religious affiliation 
reduces executive salaries.  Gray and Benson observe that nonprofit executives at small 
business development centers related to college campuses earned less than their 
colleagues serving centers without a campus affiliation.   
 Other scholars argue that human capital factors and personal characteristics like 
gender, education, and experience affect compensation levels (Oster, 1998; Gray and 
Benson, 2003).  Although not significant, the negative coefficient associated with female 
executives across nonprofit organizations was suggestive for Oster (1998).  Gray and 
Benson (2003) found education and tenure to be positively significant in their study.   
2.4 Clergy Compensation Studies 
 Operational formulas and available resources used to determine clergy 
compensation vary as much as congregations and churches (Arnold, 1991; Schuchmann, 
2000).  According to a 1999 survey on church budgets, 70 percent of the clergy 
interviewed felt that they were fairly compensated, while 30 percent felt they were 
underpaid (Schuchmann, 2000).  That study also suggested variations based on the size of 
the church or congregation as well as location where pastors of large membership 
churches in urban areas were paid more. 
 Denominational standards, cost of living, transportation and automobile expenses, 
insurance, clothing allowances, and continuing education all affect salary levels (Arnold, 
1991).  Average income of congregational families is also used as a benchmark to 
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determine appropriate clergy packages (Arnold, 1991).  Congregational documents to 
guide clergy compensation are available such as The Annual Compensation Handbook 
for Church and Staff (Schuchmann, 2000).  However, there are very few empirical 
studies focusing on the salaries of ministers. 
 Scholars have attempted to explain clergy compensation through various 
theoretical models, such as agency theory, denomination-specified labor markets, 
promotion tournaments, and free labor markets (Trawick and Lile, 2007; Zech, 2007; 
Haney, 2008).  Table A.2, in Appendix A, summarizes the research on clergy executive 
compensation.  Researchers studying the wages of clergy suggest that the key factors are: 
size, market factors, personal characteristics, human capital, congregational wealth, 
performance, and denominational affiliation (McMillan and Price, 2001; McMillan and 
Price, 2003; Trawick and Lile, 2007; Graham, 2007; Zech, 2007; Haney, 2008).  
Denominational affiliation and education exhibited mixed results as factors affecting 
clergy salaries (McMillan and Price, 2001; Trawick and Lile, 2007; Zech, 2008; Haney, 
2007). 
 The measures of size vary from congregational membership (Mcmillan and Price, 
2001; Trawick and Lile, 2007; Zech, 2007) to worship attendance (McMillan and Price, 
2003; Haney, 2008).  The market variables examined have been community size 
(Trawick and Lile, 2007; Zech, 2007), open vs. closed labor market due to congregational 
polity (McMillan and Price, 2003; Zech, 2007; Haney, 2008), and the degree of 
competition among denominations (Trawick and Lile, 2007). 
 The human capital and personal characteristic variables examined include race 
(McMillan and Price, 2003), gender (McMillan and Price, 2003; Graham, 2007; Zech, 
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2007), education (Perl and Chang, 2000; McMillan and Price, 2003), and experience 
(McMillan and Price, 2003; Zech, 2007).  Lummis (2003) and Dart (2004) include 
marital status as a personal characteristic determinant suggesting that congregations 
prefer their clergy to be younger, male, and married.  This is not a discriminatory attitude 
independent of job performance.  For instance, congregations may be willing to pay a 
premium to a clergyperson who can potentially attract young families.  Additionally, the 
spouse may be expected to take on volunteer duties.   
 Congregational wealth has been measured by laity average income (McMillan and 
Price, 2003), the cost of living index for a given geographic area (Trawick and Lile, 
2007), and the church budget (Graham, 2007; Trawick and Lile, 2007).  The performance 
measures that were investigated that affect clergy salaries are: the ability to manage a 
budget (Zech, 2007), supervision of clergy (Zech, 2007), and new members (Trawick and 
Lile, 2007).   
 Zech (2007) tests the agency relationship empirically.  He assumes that clergy are 
risk and effort averse and that in order to manage the principal-agent relationship risk 
neutral churches adopt a pay-for-performance model of compensation.  Zech finds a 
weak relationship between performance, operationalized by clergy activity measures 
(preaching, teaching, visitation, etc.), and clergy compensation. 
 The most significant results for Zech (2007) are those associated with promotion 
tournaments, where clergy compete for wages and increase their salaries through 
“promotions” by moving to larger, more prestigious, congregations with more 
responsibility.  The promotion tournament variables are: number of clergy supervised, 
membership size, and size of community.  Perl and Chang (2000) agree with Zech in 
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regards to clergy supervision as they observe that supervising others may also lead to 
increased compensation for clergy as secular norms of professionalization are exhibited 
in churches. 
 One of the dominant analytical lenses for examining clergy executive 
compensation is clergy labor markets.  A labor market is the arena where workers 
exchange their labor for pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards (Kalleberg and Sørensen, 













 The supply-side of the clergy labor market is illustrated in Figure 2.2.  Clergy 
enter the labor market by the expression of receiving a supernatural "calling" (Niebuhr, 
1977; Oden, 1983; Campbell, 1988; Perl and Chang, 2000).  This calling is similar to the 
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public-service motivation found in public service workers (Bright, 2009).  Queuing 
theory (Reskin and Roos, 1990) suggests that workers rank jobs in terms of a job queue 
where the most desirable jobs are at the top.  As such, ministerial work is high on the job 
queue for persons entering the ministry (Chang and Bompadre, 1999).  Ministers then 
enter into some form of credentialing process (e.g. licensing, seminary education, or 
ordination) where their gifts (perceived skills necessary for ministerial success) are 
affirmed, legitimizing their calling and making them suitable for deployment into the 
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 The demand-side of the clergy labor market is comprised of the congregation or 
denominational/ecclesial structure as seen in Figure 2.3.  Researchers suggest that two 
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labor market structures exist depending on whether a congregation or church operates 
autonomously or under a hierarchical structure of centralized governance (Trawick and 
Lile, 2007; Haney, 2008).  Bonifield and Mills (1980) categorize the autonomous and 
hierarchic markets of alternative denominations as competitive or monopolistic.  Scholars 
also include a third "mixed" labor market where clergy salaries are determined at the 
intersection of free market and hierarchical mandates, e.g. Zech (2007). 
 Autonomous denominations are loosely linked congregations with no formal 
hierarchical governance (e.g., various Baptist and Pentecostal denominations).  In 
contrast, hierarchical denominations operate as a single body with significant centralized 
governance at the top.  Hierarchical denominations include the Methodist, Lutheran, 
Episcopalian, and Presbyterian denominations (Haney, 2008).   
 Such variety in church governance suggests various degrees of asymmetrical 
bargaining power among pastors and congregations and denominations.  In cases where a 
denomination has a higher degree of centralized authority, as in the case of hierarchical 
denominations, pastors and congregations have less bargaining power than the 
denomination.  In autonomous denominations, the congregations have more bargaining 
power than the denomination and the pastors because the denomination cannot enforce its 
wishes on the churches and the pastors serve at the behest of the congregation. 
 The imbalance in the power dynamic as it relates to employee / employer 
negotiations is attributed to the monopsonistic nature of the labor markets for ministers 
(Chang and Bompadre, 1999).  Aside from serving as parish clergy, the employment 




 Althauser (1989) defines an internal labor market as all jobs within a firm but also 
includes occupational labor markets across firms.  Denominational clergy find 
themselves in an internal or insular labor market as they affiliate with a specific religious 
body and exempt themselves from the open clergy labor market (Chang and Bompadre, 
1999).  For example, clergy serve churches that reflect the religious orientation of the 
ministers.  It is rare for a Presbyterian minister to serve a Methodist church.  Ministers 
may transfer into another denomination that recognizes the ordination of the minister.  
However, there are educational requirements as to theology and doctrine before doing so.  
Generally, once clergypersons are in a denominational labor pool, they limit themselves 
to the insular denominational market. 
 Perl and Chang (2000) examine the degree to which education is used to create a 
stratified labor market and the effects of education on the earnings of clergywomen.  
These authors found that seminary degrees positively affect salaries more strongly in 
theologically conservative denominations that do not generally require such education 
than in liberal denominations.  Female clergy receive lower returns on their Masters of 
Divinity in denominations that require seminary education than clergywomen in 
denominations without the seminary requirement.  In congregations that are autonomous, 
having the ability to hire their own pastor and having clergy who graduated from a 
university affiliated seminary increased earnings. 
 Within the United Methodist Church, there is a Commission on Equitable 
Compensation in each Annual Conference (Olsen, 2008).  The purpose of the 
commission is to make recommendations as to minimum salary levels for clergy 
members of the annual conference.  The salary levels correspond to the conference 
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relationship of the pastor.  The conference relationship is determined by ordination status 
as it relates to the North Georgia Conference. 
 The effect of the policy guidelines from the Equitable Compensation Commission 
is consistent with dual, split, or segmented labor market theory (Kalleberg and Sørensen, 
1979; Dickens and Lang, 1985, 1988).  According to the theory, there is a difference in 
the price of labor for performing the same work within two distinct sectors, a primary and 
secondary job sector.  Some scholars suggest further distinction between upper-tier and 
lower tier jobs within the primary sector (Kalleberg and Sørensen, 1979). 
 This study suggests that the Equitable Compensation Commission, through its 
policies, creates a stratified labor market for clergy where not all ministers compete with 
each other for jobs equally.  Ordination serves to distinguish persons as set apart for 
clergy leadership within a church organization after undergoing a process of examination 
and credentialing.  Ordained clergy (ordained members of the North Georgia Annual 
Conference) compete only with other ordained clergy while the non-ordained compete 
with clergy who do not hold North Georgia ordination status. 
 Haney (2008) also suggests that there is some degree of variance within different 
denominational hierarchical structures relative to influence over compensation and 
benefits packages and pastoral assignment.  The United Methodist denomination 
possesses a more elaborate and highly structured hierarchy.  As the largest hierarchical 
denomination, its clergy labor pool is the most centrally regulated (Haney, 2008).  The 
United Methodist Church has a history of mandating minimum clergy compensation 
levels.  Regardless of the differences within hierarchical denominations, most follow 
formalized denominational guidelines or mandates for clergy compensation. 
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 Haney (2008) found that intervention by denominational hierarchies in setting 
clergy salaries raised the median salaries and benefits levels significantly, relative to the 
free labor market for clergy.  This result was consistent across denominational size.  In 
contrast to Haney (2008), Zech (2007) did not find significance related to denominational 
affiliation.  Specifically, United Methodist clergy fared no better than comparable clergy 
of other denominations. 
 McMillan and Price (2003) expanded their 2001 study of Protestant clergy 
salaries and studied market factors influencing salaries of Protestant and Catholic 
ministers.  They determined that clergy in larger Protestant churches, belonging to 
denominations with a connectional polity (e.g. centralized control over the development 
and assignment of clergy), and serving churches in urban areas, have higher salaries than 
their Catholic colleagues.  Additionally, they found that male Protestant clergy earn more 
than female clergy, and white pastors are paid more than African American pastoral 
leaders. 
 Trawick and Lile (2007) studied the labor market for Southern Baptist clergy in 
seven Southern states to determine the effects of spatial concentration on salary.  They 
found that the greater the concentration of Southern Baptist churches in a particular 
county, the higher the wages for Southern Baptist ministers.  Conversely, a high 
concentration of churches from other denominations had no perceivable effect on 
Southern clergy salaries. 
 The main goal of this chapter was to survey the literature applicable to 
understanding the factors that contribute to the salaries of clergy while providing a 
conceptual framework for viewing churches as nonprofit organizations.  The next chapter 
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proposes the general framework for clergy executive compensation that provides a point 
of departure to create an empirical model for the determinants of ministerial wages.  
Additionally, the chapter establishes the basis for a theory and the testable hypotheses 




METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 Because the literature on clergy executive compensation is sparse, in both the 
number of peer-reviewed studies and the number of studies using multivariate analysis, 
an important contribution to knowledge would be to apply the studies of nonprofit 
executive compensation to the case of executive clergy.  Many of the clergy 
compensation determinants are similar to the factors advanced by nonprofit executive 
compensation research.  The empirical analysis will include the testing of nonprofit 
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 As a part of the analysis, following Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998), this 
research proposes a general framework for clergy executive compensation in Figure 3.1.  
The clergy compensation framework (CCF) is valuable because within the framework 
there is the opportunity for theory development. 
 Ostrom (1999) describes frameworks as helping in identifying elements and 
relationships that contribute to analysis.  Frameworks organize the parameters of inquiry 
by identifying and defining the variables that would be included in a theory of a 
particular phenomenon.  They provide the meta-theoretical language by which theories 
can be compared and assist in generating the initial questions for analysis.  In this case, 
the CCF summarizes the factors identified in previous research, including nonprofit 
executive compensation studies, found to influence executive clergy wages: human 
capital, personal characteristics, organizational elements, the religious market, clergy 
labor markets, and the agency relationship (principal-agent relationship). 
 This research models the determinants of pastor's salaries, as seen in the standard 
single labor market wage model, with a log wage equation using ordinary least squares 
regression where the natural logarithm of clergy total compensation in 2008 is the 
dependent variable (Dickens and Lang, 1988; Leete, 2001).  The natural logarithm of 
clergy total compensation in 2008 is the dependent variable.  By employing the natural 
log of executive compensation, the beta coefficients on the explanatory variables are 
interpreted as percentage changes in compensation.   
 Following previous scholars (Frumkin and Keating, 2001; Baber, Daniels, and 
Roberts, 2002; Krishnan, Yetman, and Yetman, 2006) this investigation uses a lagged 
model for some of the independent variables.  The lagged model is appropriate because 
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budgets for a given year are developed in advance.  The consumer price index deflator is 
also applied to the executive compensation figures in 2008 so that they and the 2007 
financial data would be in comparable dollars. 
 One of the assumptions, pertaining to human capital2, contributing to the wage 
equation suggests that the effect of human capital on wages shares a similar concave-
shaped pattern as the wage earnings profile due to decreasing marginal rates of return 
over time (Brown, 1989).  Including quadratic specification (squared terms) for the 
human capital variables age, tenure, experience and education, in the empirical model 
accounts for the assumed curvilinear effects in the human capital earnings function. 
Therefore, the general form of the model is: 
 lnCompensation t =  f{Human Capital t-1, Personal Characteristics t-1,   
    Organizational Elements t-1, Market Factors t-1, Principal- 
    Agent Factors t-1}  
 Previous nonprofit executive compensation research (Baber, Daniels, and 
Roberts, 2002; Ruhm and Borkowski, 2003) assume an additive relationship between the 
independent variables.  Therefore, the additive specification for the general empirical 
model is a multiple linear regression of the form:3 
 lnCompensation 2008 = 0 + 1 Education 2007 + 2 Education squared 2007 +  
  3 Tenure 2007 + 4 Tenure squared 2007 + 5 Years of service 2007 + 
  6 Years of service squared 2007 + 7 Ordained + 8 Age 2007 + 
                                                 
2 Some researchers (Murphy, 1990) include age as part of human capital since age may serve as a proxy 
measure for experience.  However, in this study, age is described as a personal characteristic.  Empirically, 
age is treated with the addition of a squared term like the human capital variables. 
3 See Table B2 for a description of the variables and their measures. 
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  9 Age squared 2007 +  10 Female + 11 Black + 12 Other race + 
  13 Married + 14 lnMembership2007 + 15 lnNet Assets 2007 + 16 Clergy 
  staff expense 2007 + 17 lnLay staff expense percentage 2007 +  
  18 Competition 2007 + 19 Urban location + 20 Suburban location +  
  21 lnWorship attendance 2007 + 22 Program expense 2007 + 
  23 lnApportionments paid 2007 + ε 
3.1 Hypotheses 
 The first set of hypotheses relates to the agency relationship.  The agency 
relationship variables reflect the mission-related aims of the denomination and the 
congregation respectively.  The primary mission of the congregation is to maximize faith 
adherents.  Programmatic ministry and mission outside the confines of the church is also 
a part of the work of many churches.  The congregational mission is measured by using 
worship attendance figures and program expenditures.  Higher salaries, holding other 
variables constant, are anticipated when pastors work to achieve the local church's 
mission. 
 The mission-related goal of the denomination is to maximize apportionment 
dollars (franchise fees / taxes) from the local churches.  The apportionments are 
calculated as a percentage of church total expenses (as indicated on the end of year 
report) excluding capital expenses and programmatic ministry funds for self-supporting 
ministries.  The measure for the achievement of denominational aims is the amount of 
45 
 
money paid in apportionments.  In light of the agency relationship existing between 
clergy and the respective congregation and the denomination, several hypotheses follow:4 
 Hypothesis 1:  Ministerial wages will increase as clergy meet the mission-  
   related aims of the local church, measured by worship attendance 
   and program expense. 
  
 Hypothesis 2:  Increases in the denominational mission variable, as measured by  
   the amount of money paid in apportionments, will increase   
   executive clergy wages. 
 
The next set of hypotheses relates to congregational factors or organizational 
elements.  Under organizational elements, church membership, which measures 
organizational size, and net assets, which measures fiscal health, are applied as control 
variables.  Managerial scope describes the elements embodied in administrating the 
organization such as span of management and job complexity.  The expenses associated 
with compensating lay staff (as a percentage of total expenses) and the amount expended 
for compensating associate ministers measures managerial scope since some ministers 
supervise laity or other clergy as a part of their job portfolio.  The organizational element 
hypotheses are: 
 Hypothesis 3:  Organizational size, as measured by church membership, is  
   positively associated with clergy salaries. 
  
 Hypothesis 4:  Financially healthy congregations, as measured by net assets, will  
   pay their ministers more than their counterparts. 
  
 Hypothesis 5:  An increase in the clergy staff expense, exclusive of the senior  
   pastor's salary, will increase clergy salaries. 
  
 Hypothesis 6:  Executive clergy wages increase as the lay staff expense   
   percentage, as measured by the amount of money expended on lay  
   staff divided by total expenses, increases. 
 
                                                 




 The human capital variables are: experience, education, tenure, and a 
dichotomous variable ordination.  The personal characteristic variables are: age, race, 
gender, and marital status, a dichotomous variable.  Under human capital and personal 
characteristics, this investigation adds two additional determinants not found in the 
empirical literature, marital status and ordination.  How do clergy benefit from being 
married?  Congregations may be willing to pay a premium to a clergyperson who can 
potentially attract young families.  Additionally, the spouse may be expected to take on 
volunteer duties. 
 This study also suggests that conference relationship, as defined by ordination 
status, stratifies the clergy labor market.  The upper-stratum is comprised of clergy who 
are ordained members of the North Georgia Annual Conference of the United Methodist 
Church.  Ordination, which culminates the process of credentialing, bestows upon clergy 
voting rights within the annual conference and guaranteed employment similar to tenure 
in an academic setting.  The lower-stratum is constituted by non-ordained clergy and 
clergy who may hold ordination in other denominations or other Annual Conferences.  
There is no empiricism suggesting that ordained clergy demonstrate increased job 
productivity.  Ordination benefits clergy by moving them into an elite group within the 
Annual Conference.  The expected effect on clergy salary from human capital and 
personal characteristics follows: 
 Hypothesis 7:  Increases in human capital, as measured by tenure, education, job  
   experience, and ordination status will result in an increase in  
   clergy salary. 
  
 Hypothesis 8:  Personal characteristics, as measured by age and being married,  
   are positively associated with ministerial pay. 
  
 Hypothesis 9:  Personal characteristics, as measured by being non-white and  
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   female, are negatively associated with executive clergy wages. 
   
 The present research also includes control variables representing the religious and 
clergy labor markets as seen in Trawick and Lile (2007).  The measure for the religious 
market competition is the number of Christian denominated churches in a county.  The 
clergy market variables are the dichotomous variables urban and suburban indicating the 
location of a church assignment.  The market hypotheses are: 
 Hypothesis 10: Religious market competition will have no significant effect on  
   clergy  salaries.  
  
 Hypothesis 11: Serving in an urban setting will result in comparably higher  
   clergy salaries. 
 
 This investigation also suggests that within the market strata established through 
ordination, there will be different determinants depending upon which stratum is 
investigated. 
 Hypothesis 12: The market strata, as defined by conference relationship through  
   ordination, will determine salary level for ministers.  The higher a  
   minister's conference relationship, the more she/he will make in  
   compensation. 
  
 Hypothesis 13: The determinants of clergy compensation are strata specific.   
   There will be different factors determining clergy salaries for  
   different strata. 
  
3.2 Data Description and Limitations 
The data for the present study come from several sources.  The church level data 
come from the end of year reports of the local churches of the North Georgia Annual 
Conference of the United Methodist Church for the years 2008 and 2007.  The 
Conference is comprised of over 1000 churches, 320,000 lay members, and 1500 clergy 
(North Georgia Conference, The United Methodist Church, 2010).  Local churches are 
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required to file an annual report that includes information that describes the 




http://www.ngumc.org/pages/detail/785 accessed on 2/1/2010
  
Figure 3.2 Districts of the North Georgia Annual Conference 
  
 
The geographic bounds of the conference are illustrated in Figure 3.2.  The 
conference, located in the northern part of Georgia, is comprised of twelve districts 
covering seventy counties spanning from the Alabama state line in the west to the South 
Carolina border in the east and Tennessee in the north.  Because the current study focuses 
only on the salaries of pastors of local churches, the sample is restricted to clergy who 
served as the lead pastor in 2007.  Clergy who did not serve churches are omitted.  In 
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keeping with the analogy of the lead pastor as a nonprofit executive, associate ministers 
are not included in the investigation. 
Many studies on nonprofit executive compensation use the IRS 990 data found in 
the National Nonprofit Research Database from the National Center for Charitable 
Statistics.  The organizational data in the present research is unique in that it addresses a 
limitation found in the NCCS data.  Frumkin and Keating (2001) note that the coded data 
files from NCCS do not have labels to distinguish salaries of the executive directors from 
other senior staff.  As a result, researchers some times assume that the highest salary 
corresponds to the executive director.  The dataset used here specifically identifies the 
senior executive’s compensation.  
 Table B.3 (Appendix B) summarizes the organizational and individual data.  The 
organizational data set includes 792 churches or charges.  In cases where a number of 
smaller churches have the same pastor the grouping of churches constitutes a church 
charge.  One of the purposes in clustering churches is to constitute an appointment that 
meets the minimum salary guidelines for clergy.  After extensive cleaning to eliminate 
churches with no members and pastors with no salary, there are 568 usable observations.5 
 The average number of members in 2007 was 440 with an average weekly 
worship attendance of 167 congregants.  Clergy total compensation is comprised of a 
base salary plus housing allowance, reimbursable cash allowance, and other cash 
allowances (North Georgia Annual Conference, The United Methodist Church, 2007).  
The mean clergy total compensation is $45,728.50.  The average net assets for the 
churches is $2.3 million. 
                                                 
5 Due to the limited number of observations for the education variable, when education is included there are 
only 418 observations. 
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 A data set developed by the U.S. Department of Agriculture was used to establish 
a set of dichotomous variables (urban/suburban/rural) for the seventy counties that 
comprise the North Georgia Conference that may reflect differentials in the cost of living.  
A market competition variable, which represents the number of competing churches in a 
geographic area, was created by counting the number of churches in each county. 
 The individual level data set, provided by the Office of Data Services of the North 
Georgia Annual Conference, describes the clergy leaders’ personal characteristics.  The 
data include the clergy demographic characteristics gender, age, race, marital status, 
ordination status, and conference relationship. 
 Each clergyperson bears a particular relationship to the Annual Conference based 
on North Georgia and United Methodist ordination status as seen in Table 3.1.  There are 
both ordained and non-ordained persons serving churches.  The highest level in the 
ordained ranks is Full Connection with two categories, Elder in Full Connection and 
Deacon in Full Connection.  Provisional members are those seeking admission to the 
conference aspiring to be ordained members in Full Connection.  Clergy may serve in an 
active or retired relationship.  Non-ordained persons include seminary students and local 
pastors who may serve on a part-time or full-time basis.  Additionally, there are persons 
from denominations outside of the United Methodist Church, both ordained and non-
ordained, serving churches as they seek a transfer into the United Methodist clergy ranks 





Conference Relationship Categories 
 
 Clergy  Classifications Frequency Percentage 
Associate Member 6 .80
Deacon in Full Connection* 1 .94
Elder in Full Connection* 407 54.48
Full-time Local Pastor 28 3.75
Other Local Pastor 1 .13
Associate Member of 
Other Annual Conference 0 0.00
Elder Member of Other 
Annual Conference 13 1.74
Full Member of Other 
Denomination 15 2.01
Provisional Member of 
Other Annual Conference 1 .13
Provisional Elder* 37 4.95
Part-time Local Pastor 215 28.78
Student from other Annual  
Conference/Denomination 
serving as a Local Pastor 4 .54
Supply Pastor 19 2.54
 
Total 747 100.00
 *Indicates Full Connection and Full Connection track 
 
 In order to acquire educational information, a survey was distributed to the clergy 
members of the North Georgia Annual Conference who were serving as lead pastors in 
churches in 2007.  Individual clergy were contacted via phone and in person as follow-up 
to the survey request.  
 The data have limitations.  The population and the subsequent sample come from 
one denomination, The United Methodist Church, in one geographic area, North Georgia.  
Further, the data do not reveal the number of hours worked by any of the clergy. 
 In order to address the research question examining what factors contribute to 
clergy salary levels, the full clergy compensation model is applied to the population 
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sample and the hypotheses are tested.  The next chapter provides the data analysis and the 





RESULTS OF THE MODEL 
 
 This investigation addresses the research question: What are the determinants of 
clergy executive compensation.  The following sections provide a description of the 
results and the analysis based on the previously stated research question and hypotheses 
using two models: an overall clergy compensation model and the stratified clergy labor 
market model (Dickens and Lang, 1988).6 
4.1 Hypothesis Testing 
 
 Previously, this research proposed several hypotheses for testing the clergy 
compensation framework.  The clergy compensation model suggests that the 
determinants of clergy compensation are: education, age, tenure, years of service as a 
Methodist minister, ordination status, competition, membership size, the worship ratio, 
net assets, the apportionment payment percentage, the lay staff expense percentage, the 
agency variable, and revenue concentration.  The hypotheses are evaluated by examining 
both the sign and the significance of the independent variables.  The following results are 
from hypotheses concerning the principal-agent or agency relationship. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Some of the variables exhibit curvilinear aspects.  The curvilinear coefficient represents the marginal rates 
of change for the effect of the independent variables.  When the independent variable's coefficient is 
positive and the coefficient on the squared term is negative, the impact of the independent variable is 
increasing at a decreasing rate.  After the inflection point (peak), the influence of the independent variable 
decreases at an increasing rate.  If the coefficient on the independent variable is negative and the squared 
term has a positive coefficient, the effect of the independent variable is decreasing at a decreasing rate, then 
after reaching a trough, increases at an increasing rate.  Figures B1 – B4, in Appendix B, present the graphs 
for these variables and their inflection points.  The graphs represent a bivariate relationship while the 
inflection points reflect the multivariate relationship with compensation.  The peaks and troughs are 
calculated according to the formula –b1/2b2 where b1 equals the coefficient on the linear term and b2 is the 
coefficient on the curvilinear or squared term.  The effects on clergy compensation are interpreted around 
the predicted value (an estimate of the mean value) of salary when the independent variables have a 





 Achieving the mission-related aims of the church will positively impact the wages 
of executive clergy according to hypothesis one.  The worship attendance measure was 
significantly positive, while program expense was significantly negative in partial 
support of hypothesis one as seen in Table 4.1.  A one percent increase in the number of 
worshippers corresponds to a .32% increase in ministerial wages.  As the amount of 
money expended for ministry programs increases by one thousand dollars, clergy salary 





































Standard errors in parentheses 





4.1.2 Hypothesis Two 
 In hypothesis two, this research suggests that clergy salaries are positively 
impacted by an increase in the denominational mission variable, as measured by the 
amount of funds paid in apportionments.  Table 4.2 shows that a one percent increase in 
apportionment funds paid results in a .045% increase in clergy salary consistent with 
study expectations.  These results illustrate that a clergyperson who successfully 































Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 




4.1.3 Hypothesis Three 
 Hypothesis three predicts that the number of church members has a positive 
impact on ministerial wages.  As seen in Table 4.3, a one percent increase in membership 
size is related to a salary increase of .072%.  This result is consistent with the expectation 



























Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.1.4 Hypothesis Four 
 As seen in Table 4.4, net assets is positive and significant supporting the 
hypothesis regarding financial health.  The results suggest that wages increase by .12% 
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4.1.5 Hypothesis Five 
 Managerial scope also impacts clergy compensation as suggested by hypotheses 
five through eight.  A one thousand dollar increase in the amount expended to 
compensate clergy staff is associated with a .034% decrease in the wages of the lead 
minister as seen in Table 4.5.  The decrease in salary, though small, suggests that 
additional clergy are not viewed as adding to the supervisory responsibility of a senior 
pastor, but rather as a co-laborer reducing the workload of the lead minister.  
Alternatively, the decrease reflects a competition between dollars for the salary of the 













Clergy staff expense 














Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.1.6 Hypothesis Six 
 The lay staff percentage also positively impacts executive clergy wages.  Table 
4.6 illustrates that a one percentage point increase in the lay staff expense percentage 
corresponds to a 3.2% higher salary for clergy, in contrast to the effect of adding 
additional associate minister expenses.  The result suggests that, within the church, 
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4.1.7 Hypothesis Seven 
 How does human capital impact the wages of ministers?  Increases in certain 
human capital factors correspond to higher salaries according to hypothesis seven.  The 
results in Table 4.7 provide partial support for hypothesis seven.  An additional year of 
education corresponds to a 60% decrease in clergy wage.  Due to the curvilinear behavior 
of education in this sample, where the effect of an additional year of education does not 
benefit clergy until 21years, this result suggests that within an educated population 
additional education does not benefit an individual significantly until that individual's 
level of education clearly distinguishes that minister from other clergy.7 
   
                                                 
7 The inflection point for education is 20.6 years and the mean is 19.4 years.  In an alternative specification 





















































Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Tenure in one's current assignment benefits clergy with a 3.2% increase in salary 
for each additional year up to 11.6 years.  Ordination corresponds to a 68% increase in 
salary.  Years of service, as a Methodist minister, has no significant impact on clergy 
salary in this sample.   
4.1.8 Hypothesis Eight 
 Hypothesis eight, which offers propositions regarding the effect of personal 
characteristics on clergy compensation, is partially supported by the empirical results.  
Age positively and significantly impacts executive clergy wages.  An additional year of 
age is associated with a 3.3% increase in salary up to 43.7 years of age.  Being married 
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4.1.9 Hypothesis Nine 
 The results in Table 4.9 suggest that race and gender do not significantly impact 
clergy salary.  The negative coefficients are merely suggestive.  These results do not 






































Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4.1.10 Hypothesis Ten 
 The findings in Table 4.10 support hypothesis ten.  Religious market competition 
has no significant impact on clergy wages.  What explains the lack of significance?  
Churches may draw members from areas outside of their own county.  Churches in the 



























Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.1.11 Hypothesis Eleven 
 The results in Table 4.11 suggest that clergy serving churches in urban settings 
make 11.2% more than their rural counterparts receive in wages.  Serving a suburban 
church does not significantly affect clergy salaries.  These results uphold hypothesis 

































Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
4.1.12 Hypothesis Twelve 
 Hypothesis twelve proposes that ordination stratifies the labor market where the 
higher the ordination status, the higher the salary.  The conference relationship, as 
measured by ordination, positively and significantly impacts clergy compensation as seen 
in Table 4.7 where ordained ministerial wages are 68% higher than the wages of 
comparable non-ordained ministers.      
4.1.13 Hypothesis Thirteen 
 Hypothesis thirteen is tested by a set of comparative models.  The first model 
represents the clergy compensation model applied only to upper-stratum clergy (persons 
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who are ordained members of the North Georgia Annual Conference).  Lower-stratum 
clergy (persons who are serving as pastors but are not ordained members of the North 
Georgia Annual Conference) in the sample are examined in the second model.  
Regrettably, due to the lack of availability of data, education is removed from the 


















Years of Service 2007 0.012** 
(0.0055) 
 




Black   











Lay Staff Expense Percentage 0.046** 
(0.02) 
 
Urban Location 0.12** 
(0.047) 
 















Observations 413 155 
R-squared 0.82 0.63  
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                                                 
8 The full results of the comparison model are found in Figure B.6 in Appendix B. 
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 Hypothesis thirteen is confirmed in the results found in Table 4.12 which 
summarizes the significant variables identified by the regression analysis that determine 
clergy compensation levels in each model.  In addition to assuming clergy function in a 
stratified labor market, hypothesis thirteen proposes that the determinants of clergy 
compensation are dependent on the stratum level in which a clergyperson functions.  In 
other words, variables that demonstrate influence when applied to ordained clergy may 
not exhibit the same type of influence for non-ordained clergy. 
 Hypothesis thirteen is further tested by using interaction terms with the 
dichotomous variable ordained to determine if the variables applied in the ordained 
clergy model, have the same effect when applied to non-ordained ministers.  Interaction 
terms for each of the independent variables are created then executed using the test 
command in Stata.  The results in Table 4.13 show how ordination affects the other 
independent variables.9  The coefficients on the interaction terms are interpreted as the 
difference of differences where the independent variable impacts clergy wages by an 
additional (or reduced) amount by virtue of ordination.   
 Significant differences are exhibited for tenure, age, and the amount of 
apportionments paid in the interaction terms model.  An additional year of tenure benefits 
ordained clergy by 6.5% more than non-ordained clergy.  The wages of ordained clergy 
increase by 5.2% more than the wages of non-ordained clergy with an additional year of 
age.  Paying apportionments benefits lower-stratum clergy more than ministers in the 
upper-stratum.  Ordained clergy receive .20% less in wages than non-ordained clergy 
receive when associated with a one percent increase in the amount of apportionments 
paid.   
                                                 










Tenure squared -0.0029*** 
(0.0011) 
Years of Service -0.0171 
0.017 




















Net Assets 0.019 
0.050 
Clergy Staff Expense 
(per thousand $) 
-0.012 
0.017 








Standard errors in parentheses 













(per thousand $) 
0.0039 
0.0086 







Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 The summary of the comparative model is as follows: 
4.1.14 Human Capital Effects 
 Tenure only benefits upper-stratum clergy, where an additional year of tenure 
corresponds to a 2.9% increase in salary.  Ordained clergy are positively impacted by 
additional years of experience.  Upper-stratum clergy wages increase by 1.2% with an 
additional year of experience.   
4.1.15 Personal Characteristics Effects 
 Age also benefits the upper-stratum clergy.  Ministerial wages increase by 2.3% 
as age increases by one year for ordained clergy.   
4.1.16 Religious Market Effects 
 Religious market competition has no significant impact on clergy salaries in either 
of the models. 
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4.1.17 Clergy Labor Market Effects 
 Upper-stratum clergy benefit from serving in an urban setting.  Serving a church 
in an urban location is associated with a 12% increase in wages compared to clergy 
serving in rural areas.  A plausible explanation for the higher wage is that ordained clergy 
are more likely to serve larger and wealthier congregations located in urban areas 
4.1.18 Organizational Elements Effects  
 Membership size is positively significant in both models.  When membership 
increases by one percent, ordained clergy experience a .13% wage benefit.  Non-ordained 
clergy increase their salaries by .17% when associated with a membership increase of one 
percent.   
 Net assets is positively significant for ordained clergy.  A one percent increase in 
net assets is related to a .10% increase in salary for upper-stratum clergy.  These results 
suggest that clergy would have to demonstrate significant financial managerial acumen to 
receive a higher wage illustrating the difference between for-profit and non-profit reward 
systems. 
 As the lay staff expense percentage increases by one percentage point, ordained 
clergy experience a 4.6% salary increase.   
4.1.19 Principal-Agent Effects 
 In both models, worship attendance demonstrates a significant positive impact.  A 
.31% wage increase for ordained clergy is associated with a one percent increase in 
worship attendance.  Non-ordained clergy receive a wage increase of .31% when worship 
attendance increases by one percent.  Program expense is negatively significant in the 
first model where upper-stratum clergy experience a .10% decrease in wages as the 
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programmatic expenditures increase by one thousand dollars.  A one percent increase in 
the amount paid in apportionments is associated with a .23% wage increase for lower 
stratum clergy. 
4.2 Summary 
 The results of the analysis move us closer toward a theory of clergy executive 
compensation.  What are the determinants of clergy executive compensation according to 
the analysis?  The results suggest that the determinants of ministerial wages are: 
education, tenure, conference relationship as measured by ordination, age,  membership 
size, net assets, lay staff expenses, urban location, worship attendance, program expenses, 
and the amount paid in apportionments. 
 Ministers operate within a dual agency tension between the denomination and the 
local church.  While the worship attendance and program expenditures represents 
attaining the goals of the local church, this research assumes that faithfulness in paying 
apportionments exemplifies satisfying the preferences of the denomination.  The analysis 
shows that clergy who can accomplish both the mission-related aims of the local 
congregation and the denominational hierarchy will benefit financially. 
 Ordination status is an integral determinant not found in previous studies and 
accounts significantly for the differences.  Ordination stratifies the labor market 
distinguishing ordained clergy from their counterparts.  Ordination signals commitment 
to the denomination.  Ordination is rewarded because clergy have agreed to restrict their 
opportunities to the monopsony of the denomination rather than competing against the 




 The determinants of executive wages for ordained clergy are: tenure experience, 
membership size, net assets, lay staff percentage, urban location, worship attendance, and 
program expense.  While the factors that contribute to clergy compensation for non-
ordained ministers are: membership size, worship attendance, and the amount paid in 
apportionments.  The determinants for ordained clergy are more closely aligned to the 
clergy compensation framework proposed in this study which takes into account factors 
omitted from previous nonprofit compensation research (e.g. labor markets).  In contrast, 
the elements that contribute to the wages of non-ordained clergy are similar to the factors 




CLERGY COMPENSATION THEORY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSION 
5.1 United Methodist Clergy Appointment System 
 Clergy executive compensation in the present study is understood by applying a 
variant of principal-agent theory, dual agency, where United Methodist clergy are agents 
of two principals, the bishop, as representative of the denomination, and the local church.  
As dual agents, ministerial leaders are compelled to fulfill the mission-related objectives 
of both the local church and the denomination.  Figure 5.1 illustrates the elements in the 




















Figure 5.1 United Methodist Appointment Diagram 
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 The bishop receives information on the labor pool and the available church 
assignments annually from the district superintendents who serve as supervisors for the 
clergy.  The information regarding the clergy labor pool comes from the individual 
characteristics of the minister, the organizational factors from the present assignment, the 
market for clergy placement in terms of the next assignment, and the clergy's 
performance as informed by their annual evaluation.   
 The bishop appoints clergy to churches according to the Equitable Compensation 
guidelines adopted each year by each Annual Conference.  The recommendations create a 
floor for clergy salaries according to their conference relationship as defined by 
ordination status.  The policies, as illustrated in Figure 5.1, also serve to create a system 
of internal labor markets, through segmentation and stratification, where all clergy do not 
compete equally with all other clergy in an annual conference, as suggested by the 
present study.  Dual labor market theory proposes that even within primary sector jobs, 
those jobs that pay the most and afford opportunities for advancement and job 
satisfaction, further stratification may be present (Kalleberg and Sørensen, 1979). 
 Salary guidelines from the Annual Conference are viewed more as suggestions 
than binding agreements.  After the initial appointment to a church, the Staff Parish 
Relations Committee determines the clergy salary which then receives approval by the 
governing board or church council (Olsen, 2008). 
 The Staff Parish Relations Committee is a committee within the local church 
responsible for interpreting the mission and ministry of the United Methodist Church to 
the local church body.  In addition, the committee functions as a human resources 
department that provides oversight for recruiting, evaluating, retaining, and releasing lay 
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staff.  The Staff Parish Relations committee is also the group that evaluates clergy and 
makes recommendations regarding reappointment (retention) or reassignment (release).  
Because clergy are appointed for terms of only one year, the dual agency relationship 
creates a dyadic tension. 
5.2 Discussion and Conclusion 
 This research began by challenging the notion that churches are uniquely 
dissimilar to other organizations.  In spite of their roots in religiosity, sectarian 
organizations are in many ways analogous to firms that function in a given market and 
seek to achieve their stated aims.  In the present study, churches are characterized as 
mission-maximizing nonprofits operating in a religious market.  As such, previous 
research in organizational theory, labor market economics, and nonprofit studies are 
appropriate when applied to churches and their clergy leadership in advancing a theory of 
clergy executive compensation.  After applying the clergy compensation framework, this 
investigation found that clergy salaries are influenced in part by personal characteristics, 
human capital, organizational elements, labor market factors, and clergy performance.  
The present research adds to the nonprofit executive compensation literature by 
empirically testing for "dual agency", labor market stratification, and managerial scope. 
 Although there are several caveats before one attempts to generalize the results of 
the study to other denominations besides the United Methodist Church, this study makes 
an important contribution in understanding the determinants of clergy wages.  Further, 
this research provides insights into the development of a general theory of clergy 
executive compensation by employing the Clergy Compensation Framework (CCF). 
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 As a framework, the CCF contributes several useful elements to theory 
development.  The CCF identifies individual decision makers as the actors requiring a 
cogent theory of clergy compensation to clearly define the assumptions behind human 
behavior and decision-making. 
 The CCF also provides an opportunity to examine clergy compensation from the 
perspective of several units of analysis.  An analyst can study individual clergy, the local 
church, or the denomination as the unit of analysis.  If there are research questions, 
relating to clergy compensation that involve religious markets or the clergy labor markets 
as the units of analysis, the CCF provides for such inquiry as well. 
 The scope of the CCF extends beyond the religious context.  The framework has 
applications in studying nonprofit executive compensation because the market for 
executive labor and the competitive market between organizations have been previously 
omitted from studies on the salaries of nonprofit managers.  Further, the framework may 
be used to examine the salaries of nonprofit executives in federated and franchise 
relationships. 
5.3 The Theory 
 The degree to which clergy, as agents, achieve the aims of their principal, the 
church and/or denomination, is the main avenue through which we can understand what 
factors influence clergy salaries.  Denominational churches achieve their goals through a 
hierarchical relationship suggestive of a nonprofit franchise.  The franchise / hierarchical 
arrangement places clergy in a "dual agency" tension.  Clergy affiliated with hierarchical 
denominations operate as dual agents because they serve two principals, the 
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congregation, and the denomination.  If clergy are in autonomous churches, the local 
church is the sole principal. 
 Ordination stratifies the labor market differentiating clergy from their non-
ordained colleagues.  Further, ordination functions as a signal of commitment to the 
denomination and legitimacy to the laity resulting in financial benefit to ministers.  
Clergy are also rewarded on the basis of managerial scope, where they receive higher 
wages as compensation for their assumed managerial acumen and responsibility.  
 This research can also apply to churches outside of the United Methodist Church 
as they seek to explain the variance in clergy salaries within their denomination.  
Principal-agent theory can be applied to churches where the clergy are the agents and the 
local church is the sole principal.   
 This study recognizes that clergy operate in a labor market.  Churches without a 
hierarchy have a labor market that is comparatively more competitive.  The present 
research suggests that within the more autonomous denominations there may also be 
market stratification on the basis of some attribute that differentiates clergy from one 
another and signals commitment.  For example, as mentioned previously, Perl and Chang 
(2000) suggest that education stratifies the clergy labor market for female clergy. 
 At some point, churches engage in salary negotiations with their clergy.  The loci 
for the dialogue are religious production and labor supply.  When one asks how much 
should we pay the preacher, the underlying questions are: 1) What does the preacher 
produce that is worthy of receiving compensation; 2) Can we get the same product more 
cheaply; and 3) Can we afford the services of a minister? 
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 Religious production is similar to much of nonprofit production in that many of 
its benefits are difficult to evaluate because they are intangibles.  For the preacher, the 
intangibility challenge is exacerbated by the fact that most congregants do not observe 
what preachers actually do outside of the worship event (McMillan, 2002). 
 Salary, in many ways, is a measure of value where a higher salary is associated 
with more value.  Unfortunately, the services provided by clergy are not valued as highly 
as comparable professionals with the same level of education (Hudnut-Beumler, 1999). 
 Bonifield and Mills (1980) compare wage-setting for clergy to wage-setting in the 
public sector.  In their estimation, salary is a residual determined by the difference in 
anticipated revenues and expenses.  Since the ministerial service is delivered as a free 
good, charges do not accrue directly to the users.  Congregants benefit from the service 
whether they contribute financially (signaling value for the religious product) or withhold 
their donations, assuming there are no dues or membership fees. 
 The under-valuing of clergy by congregants is furthered by the availability of 
lower-priced substitutes.  When clergy are perceived as having no distinct talent, salaries 
are low (Bonifield and Mills, 1980).  As seen in our clergy sample, over a third of clergy 
serving as lead ministers are not Full Connection or Provisional Members of the North 
Georgia Annual Conference (non-ordained).  It is difficult to argue that a clergyperson 
brings unique attributes to an appointment and is therefore, deserving of a higher wage 
when a number of churches are receiving, from their perspective, a similar product at a 
lower price. 
 Clergy in the 1960's were on par with other professionals financially.  After the 
1960's, religious leaders were no longer viewed as a part of the cultural elite (Hudnut-
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Beumler, 1999).  Chang and Bompadre (1999) suggest that alternative opportunities 
outside the church for males in the service sector drained the potential clergy labor pool 
of prime candidates.  Clergy jobs, then, were lower in the job queue for men reflecting 
the loss of prestige (Reskin and Roos, 1990). 
 Since the prime candidates in the labor queue were in decline, secondary 
candidates (women) were given opportunities to fill the ranks of the clergy.  
Denominations had to choose between higher wages to attract their first choice or allow 
the market price to clear while admitting women. 
 Further, mainline Protestant churches have experienced a steady decline in 
membership (Chang and Bompadre, 1999; Chaves, 2002).  Researchers suggest that it 
takes at least two hundred members to support a clergyperson full-time (Chang and 
Bompadre, 1999).  The ratio of members-to-clergy has been decreasing.  The decline in 
clergy status coincided with a decline in real income for ministers.  The comparably 
lower wages and a lack of prestige have contributed to a crisis in the clergy labor supply 
for the local parish.   
 There is no lack of clergy (McMillan and Price, 2003).  There is a dearth of clergy 
willing to serve the churches that are available, many of which have small memberships  
and are located in rural areas many of which lack the financial wherewithal to support a 
professional preacher (e.g. under the 200 member threshold) (Hudnut-Beumler, 1999; 
McMillan, 2003; Chaves, 2004).  Chaves (2002) suggests that rural churches are 
particularly disadvantaged due to the lack of geographic mobility for both two-career 
families and older second-career persons entering the ministry.  Further, more mature 
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persons who enter the ministry in mid-life may have higher salary requirements than their 
younger counterparts. 
 Pallotta (2008) would argue that as religious nonprofits, churches are 
paradigmatic of what he calls nonprofit ideology characterized by a "dysfunctional 
mentality based on deprivation."  The nonprofit ideology expects religious leaders to 
provide a labor donation and accept lower wages.  Oster (1998) confirmed the negative 
impact of religious affiliation when she noted that nonprofit executives who led 
organizations with a religious affiliation were penalized financially compared to their 
counterparts who led secular organizations.  The church may have to re-think its 
preference for financial asceticism in order to attract quality leadership.  Alternatively, 
one cannot discount the effects of non-pecuniary aspects of ministerial employment that 
dominate labor supply choices perhaps more than assumed in other markets.   
5.4 Policy Implications and Future Research 
 Churches, as member-serving nonprofit organizations, are bearers of the public 
trust who receive benefits from their tax status (Chaves, 2002; Salamon, 2002).  
Receiving tax privileges places them in an arena of higher accountability.  Policymakers 
seeking higher degrees of accountability will find this study helpful enabling them to be 
better informed about the complex nature of the church and the challenges in applying 
models from either the for-profit or nonprofit sector to the church without the appropriate 
cautions.  Using this research, stakeholders can evaluate the degree to which 
congregations are public-serving, member-serving, or even pastor serving. 
 An additional implication for policy is the degree to which ordination mitigates 
gender and racial bias within the sample.  Previous wage research suggests that ethnic 
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minorities and women will have lower salaries.  However, neither the racial variables nor 
gender was significant in this investigation.  Credentialing perhaps signals a more 
desirable candidate for employment and may serve to overcome certain biases. 
   Future research on clergy compensation would include a national sample of 
churches and clergy to determine if the present model is applicable to denominations 
besides the United Methodist Church.  The national study might also include church 
boards to determine what criteria they use to evaluate and reward clergy.  Additional 
survey work might include ascertaining the number of hours worked by the clergy and 
data as to their career paths both within and outside of the church.  The data from their 
service within the church would assist in testing the dual agency hypothesis. 
 Figure 5.2 displays a proposed typology of the dual agency relationship for clergy 
in the United Methodist Church.  Clergy must meet the aims of the local church (e.g. 
church growth) and the aims of the denomination (e.g. apportionment payments).  A 
church that is dissatisfied with the pastor’s performance can seek the removal of the 
pastor.  Likewise, a bishop can move a pastor if the bishop determines that a move is in 










































Figure 5.2 Dual Agency Appointment and Compensation Matrix 
 
 
 As mentioned previously, denominational churches are analogous to nonprofit 
federated/franchise systems (Oster, 1992; Young and Faulk, 2010).  In order to increase 
apportionment receipts, bishops appoint franchise clergy, the “celebrated” in Figure 5.2.  
The celebrated clergy are those who demonstrate the ability to meet the aims of both the 
local church and the denomination.  This research suggests that the celebrated clergy are 
also the more highly compensated clergy.  The celebrated clergy are also analogous to 
those who receive primary sector jobs in segmented market theory (Kalleberg and 
Sørensen, 1979).  An additional advantage to achieving celebrated status is that over time 
ministers may experience a shift in the monopsonistic relationship with the denomination 
so that the relationship reflects more of a bilateral monopoly (Althauser, 1989).  In the 
present case, a bilateral monopoly means that the firm specific skills of the celebrated 
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clergy make them a valuable asset to the denomination because there are few readily 
available substitutes for the celebrated clergy.  It is in the best interests of the clergy to 
remain with the denomination because other employers do not value their firm specific 
skills (Althauser, 1989).   
 The “dispensable” clergy are those who do not meet the aims of the local church 
or the denomination and are subject to frequent reassignment or must remain in 
assignments that pay less, consistent with the concept of secondary sector jobs (Kalleberg 
and Sørensen, 1979).   
 The “tolerated” clergy are the company clergy whose priority is to please the 
denomination while managing, as opposed to leading, the local church.  The 
denomination/franchise will keep these clergy in place as long as the local church will 
tolerate them.  These clergy are located in both upper-stratum and lower-stratum 
churches. 
 The “questionable” clergy serve the local church well but may not pay all of their 
apportionments/franchise fees.  Whether this minister is reassigned or remains for an 
additional year is questionable.  None of these categories is static.  Since the clergy of the 
North Georgia Annual Conference are evaluated and appointed to churches each year, the 
designation may change as seen in Figure 5.3.  Movement within the diagram is achieved 
by changes in achieving the mission-related goals of either the congregation or the 
denomination.  
 Celebrated ministers may become tolerated when they can not maintain growth in 
terms of congregational goals.  They can become dispensable if they fail to achieve either 
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the denominational or the congregational aims.  Questionable status is attained when the 
denominational goals are not met.   
 Ministers in the questionable category, whose churches begin to pay the 
apportionment or increase the payment amount, can move to celebrated status.  A 
questionable minister who leads a church that continuously fails to pay receives the 
designation “dispensable.”  She/he will be penalized with reassignment to a less 








































Figure 5.3 Dual Agency Dynamic Flow Diagram 
 
 Tolerated clergy can move to celebrated status by improvement in attaining the 
congregation's mission-related goal of increasing the number of faith-adherents.  If they 
shift their focus and begin to meet the goal of the local church without maintaining the 
expected level of apportionment payments, these ministers may become questionable.  If 
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tolerated ministers lapse in apportionment payments and can not achieve the local church 
growth aims, they may become dispensable. 
 Dispensable clergy may shift to tolerated as they increase the apportionment 
payment.  They move to questionable status when they increase faith-adherents.  If the 
dispensable ministers are able to achieve "dual agency" they can move to the celebrated 
category. 
 Future research would also include a mapping of the clergy into the typology.  
The mapping of the data into the quadrants would lend support to the proposed typology 
but would also provide a point of departure for predicting the placement of clergy into 
their respective assignments. 
   Churches, like other nonprofits, will continue to contend with the tension between 
the mission and the market as it relates to clergy wages.  This research will be useful to 
church boards as they continue to struggle with questions of clergy compensation and its 
implications for recruitment, retention, and deployment by advancing questions about 
agency, the clergy labor market, and the role of credentialing as it relates to clergy wages.  
As donors gain a better understanding of the determinants of clergy compensation they 
are empowered to make better giving decisions regarding the utilization of their 
contributions.  Both scholars and practitioners can benefit as they use this study as a point 
of departure for salary development guidelines as clergy seek to fulfill their callings and 




















Findings Organization Type 
and Sample Size 
*Perl and Chang 
(2000) 
 
*Not peer reviewed 














education more in 
denominations that 
do not require and 









and Men Study 
1993-1994 Hartford 
Seminary 





are related to 
church size and the 
clergy labor 
market. 




N = 14998 
    
*Graham (2007) Clergy salary is 
related to gender.  
Female clergy 
positions are more 






present in salaries.  




than their male 
counterparts. 
Annual Conference 
Journals for Texas 
in 2006 
N = 1000 
87 
 





Findings Organization Type 
and Sample Size 
    













A less concentrated 
religious market 
results in a higher 
salary level as do 























Female clergy are 
paid less.  
Membership size, 
community size, 





weakly significant.  
Denominational 
polity does not 
seem to have an 
effect. 
 
N = 747 
88 
 

































more in salary than 
their counterparts. 
Organizational 
Type and Sample 
Size 
 
N = 425 
    









Findings Organization Type 
and Sample Size 
Oster (1998) Salary is a function 
of organizational size 
(assets), religious 
affiliation, gender of 
chief executive, 
percentage of income 
from private donors, 
and organizational 
type.   
Organizational size, 
and religious 
affiliation                      






Hospital                        
N = 95 
 
    
 Salary is a function 





expenditure.                  
 
Organizational size       
significant at p<.05 
positively affecting 
salaries. 
Higher Education         
N = 57 
 
 Salary is a function 
of organizational size 
(assets), religious 
affiliation, gender of 
chief executive, and 
percentage of income 
from private donors.     
 
Organizational size, 
religious affiliation       
significant at p<.05 
positively affecting 
salaries. 
Social Services             





Table A.2 Nonprofit Executive Compensation Research (continued)    
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Table A.2 Nonprofit Executive Compensation Research (continued)    
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Table B.1 Correlation Statistics         
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 1. Compensation 1.00        
 2. Education 0.36 1.00       
 3. Education squared 0.36 1.00 1.00      
 4. Tenure 2007 0.06 0.12 0.13 1.00     
 5. Tenure squared 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.91 1.00    
 6. Years of service in 2007 0.29 0.30 0.29 0.27 0.23 1.00   
 7. Years of service squared 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.97 1.00  
 8. Ordained 0.25 0.56 0.50 0.07 0.06 0.25 0.20 1.00 
 9. Age -0.17 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.17 0.48 0.51 0.01 
10. Age squared -0.22 0.04 0.05 0.23 0.17 0.47 0.52 0.01 
11. Female -0.15 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.10 -0.28 -0.27 -0.07 
12. Black -0.07 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.04 -0.06 -0.10 -0.02 
13. Other Race -0.06 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.03 -0.14 -0.12 -0.01 
14. Married 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.06 
15. Membership size 0.76 0.25 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.26 0.22 0.11 
16. Net Assets 0.66 0.26 0.26 0.09 0.09 0.23 0.20 0.12 
17. Clergy Staff Expense 0.71 0.27 0.28 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.08 
18. Lay Staff Expense Percentage 0.53 0.26 0.25 -0.08 -0.11 0.10 0.02 0.26 
19. Competition 0.21 0.12 0.12 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.06 
20. Urban 0.27 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.09 
21. Suburb -0.13 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.10 -0.04 
22. Worship attendance 2007 0.81 0.27 0.28 0.12 0.12 0.25 0.20 0.13 
23. Program Expense 0.70 0.27 0.27 0.15 0.16 0.25 0.21 0.10 
24. Apportionments 0.81 0.30 0.30 0.12 0.13 0.28 0.24 0.12 




Table B.1 (continued)          
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
 1. Compensation         
 2. Education         
 3. Education squared         
 4. Tenure 2007         
 5. Tenure squared         
 6. Years of service in 2007         
 7. Years of service squared         
 8. Ordained         
 9. Age 1.00        
10. Age squared 0.99 1.00       
11. Female -0.04 -0.06 1.00      
12. Black 0.02 0.00 0.09 1.00     
13. Other Race -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 1.00    
14. Married 0.02 0.02 -0.40 -0.21 0.04 1.00   
15. Membership size -0.06 -0.08 -0.13 0.00 -0.03 0.09 1.00  
16. Net Assets -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 0.56 1.00 
17. Clergy Staff Expense -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 -0.08 0.01 0.09 0.77 0.62 
18. Lay Staff Expense Percentage -0.18 -0.22 0.00 0.01 -0.09 0.02 0.30 0.32 
19. Competition 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.28 -0.01 -0.03 0.28 0.30 
20. Urban 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.21 0.00 -0.09 0.25 0.26 
21. Suburb -0.17 -0.16 -0.05 -0.09 0.05 0.03 -0.13 -0.17 
22. Worship attendance 2007 -0.09 -0.11 -0.15 -0.06 -0.01 0.11 0.92 0.56 
23. Program Expense -0.05 -0.08 -0.13 -0.10 0.03 0.10 0.82 0.54 
24. Apportionments -0.05 -0.08 -0.13 -0.11 -0.03 0.10 0.87 0.68 




Table B.1 (continued)          
 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
 1. Compensation         
 2. Education         
 3. Education squared         
 4. Tenure 2007         
 5. Tenure squared         
 6. Years of service in 2007         
 7. Years of service squared         
 8. Ordained         
 9. Age         
10. Age squared         
11. Female         
12. Black         
13. Other Race         
14. Married         
15. Membership size         
16. Net Assets         
17. Clergy Staff Expense 1.00        
18. Lay Staff Expense Percentage 0.20 1.00       
19. Competition 0.20 0.17 1.00      
20. Urban 0.23 0.21 0.63 1.00     
21. Suburb -0.14 -0.05 -0.39 -0.69 1.00    
22. Worship attendance 2007 0.82 0.35 0.22 0.20 -0.09 1.00   
23. Program Expense 0.78 0.28 0.18 0.21 -0.12 0.87 1.00  
24. Apportionments 0.86 0.36 0.20 0.24 -0.13 0.91 0.89 1.00 











Age Age in years of clergy in June of 2007 
 
Education  Years of education in 2007 
 




Years of service as a United Methodist minister 
Female 
 
Dichotomous variable identifying female clergy 
Married 
 
Dichotomous variable distinguishing married clergy 
Ordained 
 
Dichotomous variable specifying ordained ministers 
Black Dichotomous variable for black clergy 
Other Race Dichotomous variable differentiating clergy who are 
neither black nor white 
Membership Church membership in 2007 
Net assets Net assets in 2007 
Clergy staff 
expense 
The amount of money spent on clergy staff 
exclusive of the senior minister's wages in 2007 
Lay staff expense 
percentage 
The amount of money expended on lay staff as a 
percentage of total church expenditures in 2007 
Competition The number of Christian denominated churches 
located in the same county 
Urban Dichotomous variable specifying churches located in 
an urban area 
Suburban Dichotomous variable distinguishing churches 
located in a suburban area 
Worship The average worship attendance in 2007 
Program expense The amount of money expended for ministry 
programs in 2007 
Apportionments 
paid 
The amount of money spent towards the conference 
apportionment in 2007 
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Table B.3 Data Summary Statistics  Full Model       
 
Variable Observations Mean Minimum Maximum
Compensation 747 47500.84 1155.60 260604.20
Education 485 19.41 12.00 25.00
Education squared 485 379.52 144.00 625.00
Tenure 747 4.40 1.00 28.00
Tenure squared 747 34.86 1.00 784.00
Years of service 743 15.83 1.00 48.00
Years of service squared 743 386.36 1.00 2304.00
Ordained member of North 
Georgia 
747 0.64 0.00 1.00
Age 747 54.13 23.00 83.00
Age squared 747 3052.22 529.00 6889.00
Female 747 0.18 0.00 1.00
Black 747 0.16 0.00 1.00
Other Race 747 0.03 0.00 1.00
Married 747 0.87 0.00 1.00
Membership size (logged) 747 5.31 1.10 9.21
Net Assets (logged $) 739 13.99 10.46 17.58
Clergy staff expense 747 12.61 0.00 500.88
Lay staff expense percentage 
(logged) 
586 -2.09 -5.87 1.19
Competition 747 123.99 18.00 424.00
Urban 747 0.37 0.00 1.00
Suburban 747 0.40 0.00 1.00
Worship attendance (logged) 747 4.49 1.61 8.05
Program Expense (thousands 
of $) 
747 21.40 0.00 700.00
Amount of apportionments 
paid (logged $) 




Table B.4 Data Summary Statistics Upper-Stratum       
 
Variable Observations Mean Minimum Maximum
Compensation 475 62932.12 3466.80 260604.20
Tenure 475 4.38 1.00 28.00
Tenure squared 475 34.30 1.00 784.00
Years of service 475 20.29 1.00 48.00
Years of service squared 475 544.76 1.00 2304.00
Ordained member of North 
Georgia 
475 1.00 1.00 1.00
Age 475 54.60 28.00 83.00
Age squared 475 3096.58 784.00 6889.00
Female 475 0.17 0.00 1.00
Black 475 0.14 0.00 1.00
Other Race 475 0.03 0.00 1.00
Married 475 0.88 0.00 1.00
Membership size (logged) 475 5.81 2.64 9.21
Net Assets (logged $) 470 14.43 11.00 17.58
Clergy staff expense 475 19.75 0.00 500.88
Lay staff expense percentage 424 -1.91 -5.87 -0.60
Competition 475 136.40 18.00 424.00
Urban 475 0.44 0.00 1.00
Suburban 475 0.37 0.00 1.00
Worship attendance (logged) 475 4.91 2.08 8.05
Program Expense (thousands 
of $) 
475 32.31 0.00 700.00
Amount of apportionments 
paid (logged $) 




Table B.5 Data Summary Statistics Lower-Stratum       
 
Variable Observations Mean Minimum Maximum
Compensation 272 20552.83 1155.60 56845.89
Tenure 272 4.45 1.00 28.00
Tenure squared 272 35.84 1.00 784.00
Years of service 268 7.93 1.00 36.00
Years of service squared 268 105.60 1.00 1296.00
Ordained member of North 
Georgia 
272 0.00 0.00 0.00
Age 272 53.31 23.00 82.00
Age squared 272 2974.75 529.00 6724.00
Female 272 0.19 0.00 1.00
Black 272 0.18 0.00 1.00
Other Race 272 0.02 0.00 1.00
Married 272 0.86 0.00 1.00
Membership size (logged) 272 4.42 1.10 5.98
Net Assets (logged $) 269 13.22 10.46 17.31
Clergy staff expense 272 0.14 0.00 16.20
Lay staff expense percentage 162 -2.56 -4.97 1.19
Competition 272 102.34 18.00 424.00
Urban 272 0.24 0.00 1.00
Suburban 272 0.47 0.00 1.00
Worship attendance (logged) 272 3.75 1.61 5.42
Program Expense (thousands 
of $) 
272 2.36 0.00 18.58
Amount of apportionments 
paid (logged $) 
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Figure B.2 Clergy Compensation Model Curvilinear Effect of Age on Compensation  
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Figure B.3 Clergy Compensation Model Curvilinear Effect of Tenure on Compensation 
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Figure B.4 Clergy Compensation Model Curvilinear Effect of Years of Service on  
Compensation          
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Table B.6 Comparison Model Determinants of Clergy Executive Compensation  
 
Variables    Upper   Lower 
     Stratum   Stratum 
 
Tenure 0.0287*** -0.0365 
 (0.0107) (0.0242) 
Tenure squared -0.00121* 0.00172 
 (0.000642) (0.00106) 
Years of Service 0.0120** 0.0291 
 (0.00545) (0.0202) 
Years of Service squared -0.000189 -0.000901 
 (0.000119) (0.000668) 
Ordained    
   
Age 0.0226** -0.0292 
 (0.0100) (0.0223) 
Age squared -0.000280*** 0.000283 
 (9.47e-05) (0.000217) 
Female 0.0302 0.00582 
 (0.0406) (0.0924) 
Black -0.0624 -0.175 
 (0.0428) (0.106) 
Other race -0.0295 0.115 
 (0.0831) (0.318) 
Married -0.00294 0.119 
 (0.0461) (0.108) 
Average Membership in 2007 (logged) 0.125*** 0.167* 
 (0.0455) (0.0883) 
Net Assets (logged) 0.101*** 0.0819 
 (0.0227) (0.0560) 
Clergy Staff Expense -0.000343 0.0119 
(per thousand $) (0.000392) (0.0228) 
Lay Staff Expense Percentage (logged) 0.0462** 0.0402 
 (0.0204) (0.0421) 
Competition -0.000102 -0.000638 
 (0.000155) (0.000558) 
Urban 0.115** 0.0340 
 (0.0473) (0.116) 
Suburban 0.0433 -0.0771 
 (0.0415) (0.0920) 
Average Worship Attendance 2007 0.311*** 0.282*** 
(logged) (0.0452) (0.0981) 
Program Expense -0.00100*** -0.00486 
(per thousand $) (0.000338) (0.0113) 
Apportionments Paid (logged) 0.0307 0.228*** 
 (0.0203) (0.0610) 
Constant 7.767*** 7.094*** 
 (0.413) (0.945) 
Observations 413 155 
R-squared 0.82 0.63 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table B.7 Interaction Terms Model Results       
         Clergy Compensation Model 
  VARIABLE             Clergy Salary 
 
 Tenure -0.0365** 
  (0.0182) 
 Tenure squared 0.00172** 
  (0.000795) 
 Years of Service 0.0291* 
  (0.0152) 
 Years of Service squared -0.000901* 
  (0.000503) 
 Age -0.0292* 
  (0.0168) 
 Age squared 0.000283* 
  (0.000163) 
 Female 0.00582 
  (0.0695) 
 Black -0.175** 
  (0.0795) 
 Other race 0.115 
  (0.239) 
 Married 0.119 
  (0.0813) 
 Average Membership in 2007 (logged) 0.167** 
  (0.0665) 
 Net Assets (logged) 0.0819* 
  (0.0422) 
 Clergy Staff Expense 0.0119 
 (per thousand $) (0.0171) 
 Lay Staff Expense Percentage (logged) 0.0402 
  (0.0316) 
 Competition -0.000638 
  (0.000420) 
 Urban 0.0340 
  (0.0870) 
 Suburban -0.0771 
  (0.0692) 
 Average Worship Attendance 2007 0.282*** 
 (logged) (0.0739) 
 Program Expense -0.00486 
 (per thousand $) (0.00854) 
 Apportionments Paid (logged) 0.228*** 




Table B.7 Interaction Terms Model Results (continued)     
        Clergy Compensation Model 
  VARIABLE X Ordained            Clergy Salary 
      
 Tenure 0.0652*** 
  (0.0221) 
 Tenure squared  -0.00293*** 
  (0.00109) 
 Years of Service -0.0171 
  (0.0165) 
 Years of Service squared 0.000712 
  (0.000521) 
 Age  0.0518** 
  (0.0204) 
 Age squared -0.000562*** 
  (0.000197) 
 Female 0.0244 
  (0.0840) 
 Black 0.112 
  (0.0938) 
 Other race -0.144 
  (0.258) 
 Married -0.122 
  (0.0974) 
 Average Membership in 2007 (logged) -0.0419 
  (0.0850) 
 Net Assets (logged) 0.0194 
  (0.0498) 
 Clergy Staff Expense -0.0122 
 (per thousand $) (0.0171) 
 Lay Staff Expense Percentage (logged) 0.00597 
  (0.0396) 
 Competition 0.000536 
  (0.000457) 
 Urban 0.0808 
  (0.103) 
 Suburban 0.120 
  (0.0844) 
 Average Worship Attendance 2007 0.0283 
 (logged) (0.0906) 
 Program Expense 0.00386 
 (per thousand $) (0.00855) 
 Apportionments Paid (logged) -0.197*** 
  (0.0516) 
 Constant 7.094*** 
  (0.711) 
 Observations 568 
 R-squared 0.858 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Althauser, R. P. (1989). Internal Labor Markets. Annual Review of Sociology, 15, 143-
161. 
 
Anderson, G. M. (1988). Mr. Smith and the Preachers: The Economics of Religion in the 
Wealth of Nations. The Journal of Political Economy, 96(5), 1066-1088. 
 
Anheier, H. (2005). Nonprofit Organizations: Theory, Management, Policy. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Arnold, S. A. (1991). What's Fair Pay for Your Pastor [Electronic Version]. Action 
 Information,  18. Retrieved August 8, 2008 from 
 http://www.congregationalresources.org/article0418.asp. 
 
Baber, W. R., Daniel, P. L., & Roberts, A. A. (2002). Compensation to Managers of 
Charitable Organizations: An Empirical Study of the Role of Accounting 
Measures of Program Activities. Accounting Review, 77(3), 679-693. 
 
Bacidore, J., Boquirt, J., Milborn, T., & Thakor, A. (1997). The Search for the Best 
Financial Performance Measure. Financial Analysts Journal, 53(3), 11-20. 
 
Barkema, H. G., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (1998). Managerial Compensation and Firm 
Performance: A General Research Framework. Academy of Management Journal, 
41(2), 135-145. 
 
Barton, N., & Gose, B. (2008). Executive Pay Outpaces Inflation. Chronicle of 
Philanthropy, 20(24), 2-2. 
 
Barton, N., Di Mento, M., & Sanoff, A. (2006). Top Nonprofit Executives See Healthy 
 Pay Raises. Chronicle of Philanthropy, 18(24), 15. http://ezproxy.gsu.edu:4518 
 
Becker, G. S. (1962). Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis. The Journal 
of Political Economy, 70(5), 9-49. 
 
Bonifield, W. C., & Mills, E. W. (1980). The Clergy Labor Markets and Wage 
Determination. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 19(2), 146-158. 
 
Bright, L. (2009). Why Do Public Employees Desire Intrinsic Nonmonetary 
Opportunities? Public Personnel Management, 38(3). 
 
Brody, E. (2002). Accountability and Public Trust. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The State of 




Brown, J. N. (1989). Why Do Wages Increase with Tenure? On-the-Job Training and 
Life-Cycle Wage Growth Observed within Firms The American Economic Review 
 79(5), 971-991. 
 
Buchanan, J. M. (1965). An Economic Theory of Clubs. Economica, 32(125), 1-14. 
 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (2009). Occupational Employment Statistics Atlanta-Sandy 
 Springs-Marietta Area May 2008.  Accessed on October 30, 2009. 
 
Cadge, W., & Wuthnow, R. (2006). Religion and the Nonprofit Sector. In W. W. Powell 
& R. Steinbert (Eds.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (2nd ed.). 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Campbell, D. M. (1988). The Yoke of Obedience: The Meaning of Ordination in 
Methodism. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press.  
 
Chang, C.F., and Tuckman, H. (1990). Why Do Nonprofit Managers Accumulate 
 Surpluses, and How Much Do They Accumulate? Nonprofit Management and 
 Leadership, 1(2): 117-135. 
 
Chang, P. M. Y., & Bompadre, V. (1999). Crowded Pulpits: Observations and 
Explanations of the Clergy Oversupply in the Protestant Churches, 1950-1993. 
Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 38(3), 398-410. 
 
Chaves, M. (1994). Secularization as Declining Religious Authority. Social Forces, 
72(3), 749-774. 
 
Chaves, M. (2002). Religious Congregations. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The State of 
Nonprofit America. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. 
 
Chaves, M. (2004). Congregations in America. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Coase, R. H. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-405. 
 
Conyon, M. J., & Peck, S. I. (1998). Board control, remuneration committees, and top 
management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41(2), 146. 
 
Dart, J. (2004). Young, male and married. The Christian Century, 121(4), 9. 
 
Deckop, J. R. (1988). Determinants of Chief Executive Officer Compensation. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 41(2), 215 - 226. 
 
Dickens, W. T., & Lang, K. (1985). A Test of Dual Labor Market Theory. The American 




Dickens, W. T., & Lang, K. (1988). The Reemergence of Segmented Labor Market 
Theory. The American Economic Review, 78(2), 129-134. 
 
Eisenberg, P. (2007). Skyrocketing CEO Pay Raises Questions for Charities. Chronicle of 
 Philanthropy, 19(8), 37. http://ezproxy.gsu.edu:4518 
 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency Theory: An Assessment And Review. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14(1), 57-74. 
 
Ezzamel, M., & Watson, R. (1998). Market comparison earnings and the bidding-up of 
executive cash compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom. Academy of 
Management Journal, 41(2), 221. 
 
Fama, E. F. (1980). Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political 
Economy, 88(2), 288-307. 
 
Finke, R. (1997). An Orderly Return to Tradition: Explaining the Recruitment of 
Members into Catholic Religious Orders. Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion, 36(2), 218-230. 
 
Finke, R., & Starke, R. (2005). The Churching of America, 1776-2005: Winners and 
Losers in Our Religious Economy (2nd ed.). New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Rutgers University Press. 
 
Finkler, S. A. (2005). Financial Management for Public, Health, and Not-for-Profit 
Organizations. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall. 
 
Finkelstein, S., & Boyd, B. K. (1998). How much does the CEO matter? The role of 
managerial discretion in the setting of CEO compensation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 41(2), 179. 
 
Frumkin, Peter and Keating, Elizabeth K., The Price of Doing Good: Executive 
Compensation in Nonprofit Organizations (October 2001). Hauser Center for 
Nonprofit Orgs. Working Paper No. 8. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=292253 or DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.292253 
 
Gill, A. J. (2007). The Political Origins of Religious Liberty:  Initial Sketch of a General 
Theory In The Political Origins of Religious Liberty. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
General Commission on Archives and History of the United Methodist Church (2009). 
 http://www.gcah.org/site/c.ghKJI0PHIoE/b.3828783/k.1F6D/United_Methodist_
 Membership_Statistics.htm accessed October 21, 2009. 
 
Giving USA 2009, a publication of Giving USA Foundation
TM
, researched and written by 




Gomez-Mejia, L., & Wiseman, R. M. (1997). Reframing Executive Compensation: An 
Assessment and Outlook. Journal of Management, 23(3), 291. 
 
Gose, B., Aikman, J., Kerkman, L., & Moore, C. (2004). Executive Pay Rises Modestly. 
 Chronicle of Philanthropy, 16(24), 31-48. http://ezproxy.gsu.edu:4518 
 
Graham, J. R. (2007). An Examination of United Methodist Clergy. University of Texas 
at Arlington, Arlington, TX. 
 
Gray, S. R., & Benson, P. G. (2003). Determinants of Executive Compensation in Small 
Business Centers. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 13(3), 213-227. 
 
Greenlee, J. S., & Trussel, J. M. (2000). Predicting the Financial Vulnerability of 
Charitable Organizations. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 11(2), 199. 
 
Grimaldi, J. V. (2007). Smithsonian Head's Expenses 'Lavish', Audit Says [Electronic 
 Version]. Washington Post. Retrieved January 13, 2008. 
 
Gronbjerg, K. (1993) Understanding Nonprofit Funding: Managing Revenues in Social 
 Services and Community Development Organizations. San Francisco: Jossey-
 Bass. 
 
Hacker, A. (1997). Money: Who Has How Much and Why. New York: Touchstone. 
 
Hager, M. A. (2001). Financial Vulnerability among Arts Organizations: A Test of the   
 Tuckman-Chang Measures. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 30(2), 
 376-392. 
 
Hall, P. D. (2006). A Historical Overview of Philanthropy, Voluntary Associations, and 
 Nonprofit Organizations in the United States, 1600-2000. In W. W. Powell & R. 
 Steinberg (Eds.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook. New Haven: Yale 
 University Press. 
 
Hallock, K. F. (2002). Managerial Pay and Governance in American Nonprofits. 
Industrial Relations, 41(3), 377-406. 
 
Haney, B. R. (2008). "The Relationship Between Labor Market Structure and Clergy 
 Compensation in Protestant Denominations." Atlantic Economic Journal 36(1): 
 65-75. 
 
Hansmann, H. (1987). Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization. In W. Powell 
(Ed.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Vol. 1). New Haven: Yale 
University. 
 
Hatt, P. K. (1950). Occupation and Social Stratification. The American Journal of 




Herman, R. D., & Renz, D. O. (1999). Theses on Nonprofit Organizational Effectiveness. 
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 28(2), 107-126. 
 
Heyes, A. (2005). The economics of vocation or `why is a badly paid nurse a good 
nurse'? Journal of Health Economics, 24(3), 561-569. 
 
Hodgson, P. C., & Williams, R. C. (1985). The Church. In P. C. Hodgson & R. H. King 
(Eds.), Christian Theology: An Introduction to Its Traditions and Tasks. 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press. 
 
Hudnut-Beumler, J. (1999). Historical Myths About Financing American Christianity. In 
M. Chaves & S. L. Miller (Eds.), Financing American Religion. Walnut Creek, 
CA: AltaMira Press. 
 
Iannaccone, L. R., & Berman, E. (2006). Religious Extremism: The Good, the Bad, and 
the Deadly. Public Choice, 128(1-2), 109-129. 
 
Inglis, S., & Alexander, T. (1999). Roles and responsibilities of community nonprofit 
boards. Nonprofit Management & Leadership, 10(2), 153. 
 
James, E. (1987). The Nonprofit Sector in Comparative Perspective. In W. W. Powell 
(Ed.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Vol. 1). New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
 
James, E. (1989). The Nonprofit Sector in International Perspective: Studies in 
 Comparative Culture and Policy. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Jensen, B., Kerkman, L., Moore, C., & Di Mento, M. (2005). Pay Raises for Charity 
 Leaders Keep Pace With Inflation. Chronicle of Philanthropy, 17(24), 37-57. 
 http://ezproxy.gsu.edu:4518 
 
Kalleberg, A. L., & Sorensen, A. B. (1979). The Sociology of Labor Markets. Annual 
Review of Sociology, 5, 351-379. 
 
Klick, J. (2006). Salvation as a selective incentive. International Review of Law and 
Economics, 26, 15-32. 
 
Krishnan, R., Yetman, M. H., & Yetman, R. J. (2006). Expense Misreporting in 
Nonprofit Organizations. Accounting Review, 81(2), 399-420. 
 
Leete, L. (2000). Wage Equity and Employee Motivation in Nonprofit and For-profit 




Leete, L. (2006). Work in the Nonprofit Sector. In W. W. Powell & R. Steinberg (Eds.), 
 The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (2nd ed.). New Haven: Yale 
 University. 
 
Lewis, G. B. (2005). Bivariate Regression: PAUS 9111 Advanced Research Methods 
Notes. Atlanta, GA: Georgia State University. 
 
Lipford, J., McCormick, R. E., & Tollison, R. D. (1993). Preaching matters. Journal of 
Economic Behavior & Organization, 21(3), 235. 
 
Lummis, A. T. (2003). What do Lay People Want in Pastors? Answers from Lay Search 
Committee Chairs and Regional Judicatory Leaders. Durham, NC: Duke 
University. 
 
McKinney, J., & Finke, R. (2002). Reviving the Mainline: An Overview of Clergy 
Support for Evangelical Renewal Movements. Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion, 41(4), 771-783. 
 
McMillan, B. R., & Price, M. J. (2001). At Cross Purposes? Clergy Salaries: Market and 
Mission: Pulpit and Pew Working Paper Duke Divinity School. 
 
McMillan, B. R. (2002). What Do Clergy Do All Week? : Pulpit and Pew Working Paper 
Duke Divinity School. 
 
McMillan, B. R., & Price, M. J. (2003). How Much Should We Pay the Pastor: A Fresh 
Look at Clergy Salaries in the 21st Century. Pulpit and Pew Research Reports, 
2(Winter 2003). 
 
Mesch, D. J., & Rooney, P. M. (2008). Determinants of compensation: A study of pay, 
performance, and gender differences for fundraising professionals. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 18(4), 435-463. 
 
Moore, C. (2004). How The Chronicle Conducted Its Annual Survey of Pay at Big 
 Nonprofit  Groups. Chronicle of Philanthropy, 16(24), 46. 
 http://ezproxy.gsu.edu:4518 
 
National Council of Churches (2006). Membership Statistics For The National Council of 
 Churches' Member Communionshttp://www.ncccusa.org/news/061102 
 updatedstats.htm accessed October 21, 2009. 
 
National Council of Churches (2010). News from the National Council of Churches 
 "Catholics, Mormons, Assemblies of God growing; Mainline churches report a 
 continuing decline" http://www.ncccusa.org/news/100204yearbook2010.html 




Niebuhr, H. R. (1929). The Social Sources of Denominationalism New York: Henry Holt 
and Co. 
 
Niebuhr, H. R. (1977). The Purpose of the Church and its Ministry : Reflections on the 
Aims of Theological Education New York: Harper and Row. 
 
North Georgia Conference of the United Methodist Church (2009). 
 http://northgaumc.s3.amazonaws.com/Files/Clergy%20and%20Compen%20-
 %20Treasurer/Clergy_Compen_and_Expenses_Worksheet.pdf accessed on 
 October 19, 2009. 
 
North Georgia Conference. Local church histories, 1812-[ongoing]. Pitts Theology 
 Library Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia.  Accessed August 2009. 
 
Oden, T. C. (1983). Pastoral Theology: Essentials of Ministry. San Francisco: Harper and 
Row. 
 
Olsen, H. J. (Ed.). (2008). The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church 2008. 
Nashville, TN: The United Methodist Publishing House. 
 
Oster, S. M. (1992). Nonprofit organizations as franchise operations. Nonprofit 
Management and Leadership, 2(3), 223-238. 
 
Oster, S.M. (1998). Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector. Nonprofit 
 Management  and Leadership, 8(3): 207-221. 
 
Ostrom, E. (1999). Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the 
Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Ostrower, F., & Stone, M. A. (2006). Governance: Research Trends, Gaps, and Future 
Prospects. In W. W. Powell & R. Steinberg (Eds.), The Nonprofit Sector: A 
Research Handbook (2nd ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Pallotta, D. (2008). Uncharitable: How Restraints on Nonprofits Undermine Their 
Potential. Lebanon, New Hampshire: Tufts University Press. 
 
Pavlik, E. L., Scott, T. W., & Tiessen, P. (1993). Executive compensation: Issues and 
research. Journal of Accounting Literature, 12, 131. 
 
Perl, P., & Chang, P. M. Y. (2000). Credentialism Across Creeds : Clergy Education and 
Stratification in Protestant Denominations. Journal for the Scientific Study of 




Pew Forum for Religion and Public Life (2003).  Proceedings from the Pew Forum on 
 Religion & Public Life “The Faith-Based Initiative Two Years Later: Examining 
 its Potential,  Progress and Problems” March 2003 http://pewforum.org/ 
 events/index.php?EventID=41 accessed on November 19, 2006. 
 
Preston, A. E. (1989). The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World Journal of Labor 
Economics, 7(4). 
 
Reskin, B. F., & Roos, P. A. (1990). Job Queues, Gender Queues: Explaining Women’s 
Inroads into Male Occupations. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Reskin, B. (1993). Sex Segregation in the Workplace. Annual Review of Sociology, 19, 
241-270. 
 
Robbins, K. C. (2006). The Nonprofit Sector in Historical Perspective: Traditions of 
Philanthropy in the West. In W. W. Powell & R. Steinberg (Eds.), The Nonprofit 
Sector: A Research Handbook. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Roof, W. C. (1999). Spiritual Marketplace: Baby Boomers and the Remaking of 
American Religion. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Ross, S. A. (1973). The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. The 
American Economic Review, 63(2), 134-139. 
 
Roth, J. I. (1997). Three Aspects of the Rabbinate: Compensation, Competition, and 
Tenure. Drake Law Review, 45(3), 569-624. 
 
Ruggles, S., Sobek, M., Alexander, T., Fitch, C.A., Goeken, R., Hall, P.K., King, M., & 
Ronnander, C. (2009).  Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 4.0 
[Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis, MN: Minnesota Population Center 
[producer and distributor], 2009. http://usa.ipums.org/usa/ accessed on October 
13, 2009. 
 
Ruhm, C. J., & Borkoski, C. (2003). Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector The Journal 
of Human Resources, 38(4), 992-1021. 
 
Sabatier, P. (1999a). Fostering the Development of Policy Theory. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), 
Theories of the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Sabatier, P. (1999b). The Need for Better Theories. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of the 
Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Salamon, L. M. (2002). The Resilient Sector. In L. M. Salamon (Ed.), The State of 




Sandler, T., & Tschirhart, J. T. (1980). Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative 
Survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 18(4). 
 
Sataline, S. (2007). Politics & Economics: Finances of Six Evangelists Draw Senator's 
 Scrutiny. Wall Street Journal, p.A.6. 
 
Schlager, E. (1999). Frameworks, Theories, and Models. In P. Sabatier (Ed.), Theories of 
the Policy Process. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 
Schuchmann, Jennifer (2000), “What to Pay the Pastor: Advice from Church Leaders and 
 Financial Experts on How to Determine a Pastor’s Salary,” Your Church, 
 May/June 46  (3) p.22 
 
Schultz, T. W. (1962). Reflections on Investment in Man. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 70(5), 1-8. 
 
Schwinn, E., Wilhelm, I., Larose, M., Krauze, S., & Murray, M. (2003). Nonprofit CEO's 
 See Salaries Rise. Chronicle of Philanthropy, 15(24), 27.http:// 
 ezproxy.gsu.edu:4518 
 
Smith, A. (1952). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. 
Chicago: William Benton, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 
 
Spence, M. (1973). Job Market Signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355-
374. 
 
Steinberg, R. (2006). Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organizations. In W. W. Powell & 
R. Steinbert (Eds.), The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (2nd ed.). New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Tosi, H. L., Werner, S., Katz, J. P., & Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000). How Much Does 
Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies. Journal of 
Management, 26(2), 301-339. 
 
Trawick, M. W., & Lile, S. E. (2007). Religious Market Competition and Clergy Salary: 
Evidence from SBC Congregations in the South. The American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology, 66, 747-763. 
 
Trussel, J. M. (2002). Revisiting the Prediction of Financial Vulnerability. Nonprofit 
Management & Leadership, 13(1), 17. 
 
Tuckman, H. P., & Chang, C. F. (1991). A Methodology for Measuring the Financial 
Vulnerability of Charitable Nonprofit Organizations. Nonprofit and Voluntary 




Twombly, E. C., & Gantz, M. (2001). Executive Compensation in the Nonprofit Sector 
New Findings and Policy Implications [Electronic Version]. Urban Institute 
Charting Civil Society. Retrieved October 6, 2009. 
 
Twombly, E. C., & Harvey, N. L. B. (2007). The Pay for Performance Link in the 
Nonprofit Sector Paper presented at the ARNOVA Conference November 2007, 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
 
United States Census Bureau (2009). County Names and Codes. http://www.census.gov/ 
 datamap/fipslist/AllSt.txt accessed on September 28, 2009. 
 
United States Department of Agriculture (2009). Rural-Urban Continuum Codes 
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/RuralUrbanContinuumCodes/ accessed on 
September 28, 2009. 
 
Weber, D. A., & Morgan, K. (Eds.). (2007). The Journal of the North Georgia 
Conference of the United Methodist Church. Athens Georgia. 
 
Weisbrod, B. A. (1962). Education and Investment in Human Capital. The Journal of 
Political Economy, 70(5), 106-123. 
 
Weisbrod, B. A. (1977). The Voluntary Nonprofit Sector.  Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath 
and Co. 
 
Weisbrod, B. A. (1983). Nonprofit and Proprietary Sector Behavior: Wage Differentials 
among Lawyers. Journal of Labor Economics, 1(3). 
 
Wilder, D. A. (1978). Perceiving Persons as a Group: Effects on Attributions of Causality 
and Beliefs. Social Psychology, 41(1), 13-23. 
 
Williamson, S.H. (2010) "Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar 
Amount, 1790 to Present," MeasuringWorth, 2010. URL 
http://www.measuringworth.com/ uscompare/  
 
Wuthnow, R. (1994). God and Mammon in America. New York: The Free Press. 
 
Wuthnow, R. (1997). The Crisis in the Churches: Spiritual Malaise, Fiscal Woe. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Young, D. (1984). Performance and Reward in Nonprofit Organizations: Evaluation, 
 Compensation, and Personal Incentives. Working Paper Program on Non-profit 
 Organizations Yale University and The Institution for Social and Policy Studies 
 Case Western Reserve University, Yale University and The Institution for Social 




Young, D. (1987). Executive Leadership in Nonprofit Organizations. In W. Powell (Ed.), 
The Nonprofit Sector: A Research Handbook (Vol. 1). New Haven: Yale 
University. 
 
Young, D. R. (2002). The Influence of Business on Nonprofit Organizations and the 
Complexity of Nonprofit Accountability: Looking Inside as Well as Outside. The 
American Review of Public Administration, 32(1), 3-19. 
 
Young, D. R. and Faulk, L. (2010).  “Franchises and Federations: The Economics of 
 Multi-site Nonprofit Organizations.”  In Bruce A. Seaman and Dennis R. Young, 
 eds.  Handbook of Research on Nonprofit Economics and Management.   Edward 
 Elgar Publishers. 
 
Zech, C. (2001). An agency analysis of church-pastor relations. Managerial and Decision 
Economics, 22(6), 327. 
 
Zech, C. (2007). The Agency Relationship in Churches An Empirical Analysis. American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology, 66(4), 727-746. 
 
http://www.irs.gov/charities/charitable/article/0,,id=175418,00.html. Page Last Reviewed 
 or Updated: January 05, 2009. 
 
http://www2.guidestar.org/rxa/news/articles/2004/why-ratios-arent-the-last-word.aspx. 
 Accessed on October 17, 2009. 
 
http://www.ngumc.org/pages/detail/1 accessed on February 9, 2010 
http://www.religionomics.com/old/erel/S2-Archives/Iannaccone%20-%20 
 Progress-D.pdf. Accessed on October 17, 2009. 
 
Stata FAQ How can I check for collinearity in survey regression? UCLA: Academic 
 Technology Services, Statistical Consulting Group from 
 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/svycollin.htm (accessed October 5, 2010). 
 
Stata FAQ How can I perform the likelihood ratio, Wald, and Lagrange multiplier (score) 
 test in Stata?  UCLA: Academic Technology Services, Statistical Consulting 
 Group from http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/faq/nested_tests.htm (accessed on 
 July 29, 2010) 
 
In Stata, how do I conduct the Chow Test?  University Information Technology Services 
 Knowledge Base from http://kb.iu.edu/data/chow.html (accessed on August 17, 
 2010). 
  
 
